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1. INTRODUCTION
"The issue, then, is....what can be rescued from medium 
term planning that is also feasible' (Killick, 1976:179).
Two of the suggestions which...recur in this part of the 
development literature are a greater preoccupation with 
public expenditure and the budget and more decentralization 
of decision making." (Allan & Hinchliffe, 1982:5).
The national and regional development planning practiced in Africa 
in the 1950s, 60s and 70s generated many disappointments. Plans were 
often unimplementable, and outdated almost as soon as they appeared; 
even when implemented, centrally conceived physical and economic 
blueprints often failed to give the intended results. Two of the 
resulting lines of concern were how to make planning more opera­
tional, for example by linking it to budgeting, and how to mobilize 
the information and energies at various levels through multi-level 
planning or "decentralization". Given those concerns, the ex­
periences in Botswana are worth analysing.
Botswana's systems of decentralization and development planning 
deserve attention on a number of counts. They have coped relatively 
well with the demands set by an extraordinary rate of economic 
growth; real GDP grew at an average rate of 12% p.a. in 1965-1985, 
and at present the boom continues. [1] The system of economic 
planning has been praised for effectiveness and realism, combining 
considerable elaboration of procedures with substantial flexibility 
and manageability (Vorld Bank, 1981; Raphaeli et al, 1984; Harvey & 
Lewis, 1988); and the sub-system of district development planning 
has been praised similarly (Reilly, 1981). The system of local 
government institutions, while weak in several respects, is notable 
for its persistence and. stability over 20 years, in contrast to 
those in most African countries. Predominantly elected District and 
Urban Councils, with significant responsibilities and ability to 
speak out, have continued without being replaced. The implementation 
of rural projects for physical and social infrastructure, and of 
drought relief, has been deemed exemplary (e.g. Hay, 1986 & 88).
Box 1 takes the example of the drought relief, which is critical in 
Botswana. It also shows an approach that combines a coherent 
centrally-set policy with an emphasis on working through and 
strengthening existing local organizations. This covers Councils, 
local committees and the local arms of central ministries. Through 
experience and with support they become able to work better with 
central and foreign organizations. While Botswana has had a number 
of advantages, equally important has been the effectiveness of this 
programme conception and design (Hay, 1988). Hopefully that is 
replicable. There is also a darker side to drought, with the reduc­
tion of many rural families to dependence, and a trend of 
desertification that may be linked to the cattle boom which has 
enriched a minority of others. We will return to that side in sec­
tion 4.
BOX 1 - DROUGHT RELIEF IN BOTSWANA IN THE 1980S
Droughts are so normal in Botswana that Governments cannot indulge 
in wishful thinking about whether or not there will be another in 
the next few years. Pressure on government stems also from its 
accountability in fixed-date elections. (Vice-President Mmusi was 
defeated in water-short Gaborone in 1984.) The response has been 
guided, as in most areas, by belief in careful and open analysis, 
and by mistrust of organizational gimmicks. By the mid-1980s 
Botswana had built up an efficient drought relief system, operating 
through existing Ministries and local authorities. [2]
While the 1970s enjoyed exceptionally good rains, memories of the 
severe droughts of the mid 1960s and earlier did stimulate some 
safety measures. But a thorough framework of policy and organization 
was not in place when in 1979 there was another severe drought. This 
continued in the north in 1980. Distribution of food was late and 
uneven. Promptly in early 1981 the government commissioned two hand­
picked consultants to review 1979/80 food distribution and relief 
projects. Their reports were openly debated, including at a special 
conference. A government response was then quickly formulated. 
Rather than as suggested switching the troubled food distribution 
organization to the powerful Finance & Planning Ministry, government 
upgraded it within the Local Government Ministry. This may have 
helped retain adequate liaison with local authorities. Finance's 
weight was still lent to the new system by having it chair the 
supervisory Inter-Ministerial Drought Committee. Many other detailed 
changes were discussed and several were adopted.
Serious drought returned as soon as 1982, and has continued for 
several years. Grain output fell, from covering almost half of 
national requirements in the 1970s, to negligible levels. 
Fortunately it was not necessary to spend time discussing basics of 
policy and organization, or to desperately import them wholesale 
from an international food donor. By 1984 over half the rural 
population were regularly receiving food, and up to 70% benefitted, 
through sharing of rations in households (Holm & Cohen, 1986:21). 
Distribution was, by international standards, timely, proper and 
efficient. This was helped by use of the District Administration, 
Councils, schools and health posts for local allocation. Secondly, 
by 1984/5 60-70,000 people p.a. were obtaining income from "Labour 
Based Relief Projects" (LBRPs) - perhaps a quarter of the available 
rural labour force. Projects are proposed via the village develop­
ment committees, in consultation with councils' Community 
Development staff. Council Planning Officers and central government 
drought relief staff formalize the projects and submit them to 
higher levels; later they are supervised and supported mainly by 
Council staff (Egner 1986:87). Thirdly, supply of water for human 
consumption is handled by the Ministry of Water Affairs and the 
Councils, and has reached the vast majority. Finally, there are
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measures to help people reestablish themselves, managed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. District Drought Committees help coor­
dinate the above activities.
All this has meant considerable strain on local-level staff, includ­
ing teachers and nurses. Other duties could suffer. The technical 
quality of LBRPs supervised by Council staff has generally been low. 
But the main goals, those of distribution, are met. On the key 
criterion of severe child malnutrition, Botswana is reported to have 
the best record in drought-affected Africa, limiting incidence to 
just 1% (Holm & Morgan, 1985:469). Malnutrition is in fact below 
pre-drought levels, as food is more equitably distributed and even 
the amount of food available per head has increased (Holm & Cohen, 
1986). For Egner (1986), Councils have been the unsung heroes, 
proving themselves capable of taking on unexpectedly large new 
responsibilities. [3]
The experience here with working through established arms of central 
and local government (and the private sector) contrasts favourably 
with that in many countries, which have failed to build up their own 
systems and belatedly had to call for emergency support directed by 
international relief organizations and NGOs. The newly arrived 
international aid-ers are inevitably relatively ignorant and alien. 
In contrast: "International agencies are so impressed by 
[Botswana's] own relief organization that they channel all their 
support through it" (Holm & Cohen, 1986:20). Botswana has made 
heavy use of foreign expertise, but mainly in the form of 
specialists on 2-3 year renewable contracts. They can be in­
dividually selected and inducted, rather than indiscriminately 
imported en masse in an emergency. External evaluators are also 
regularly commissioned.
Prompt response to drought is helped by Botswana's favourable finan­
cial situation, and its cautious accumulation of reserves during the 
drought-free 1970s. Apart from the food, nearly all costs of the 
programme are now met locally. The volume of food that is donated 
is still much more per capita than in far poorer Sahel countries - 
because donors know that it will be efficiently distributed (Holm & 
Morgan, 1985:478).
This paper reviews experiences in the twenty years since independ­
ence in 1966. The main period covered is from 1970/71 (when the 
Ministry of Finance & Development Planning, the Rural Development 
Council and the District Development Councils were formed) through , 
to 1985/86 (the end of the fifth National Plan, and beginning of the 
sixth). Section 4 discusses recent trends, but the paper does not 
claim to be up-to-the-minute. Rural rather than urban development 
will be emphasized.
Section 2 presents the background and institutions for planning and 
decentralization in Botswana. The country's physical extent itself 
works against an exclusively central administration. Political,and 
economic conditions - including the lack of deep divisions and the 
easy availability of funds (though not of skilled manpower) - are 
also favourable to moderate decentralization, within a unitary 
state. There is extensive delegation by central politicians to 
administrators and planners - within definite limits, which we will 
see; In the development bureaucracy there is centralization around 
the Finance and Planning Ministry. At the least this aids the 
disciplined management of public finances. The Local Government 
ministry in turn has considerable power relative to district 
organizations. Yet the lower-level organizations are in each case 
ongoing, active, and expanding. While District Councils in par­
ticular have grown greatly in the 1980s, a four-part system of local 
administration is valued and is being kept.
Section 3 looks at the processes of development management. Both 
central and local government projects are within a system that 
closely links medium term planning, annual budgeting and project 
planning and management. It is a system geared to maximizing the 
rate of development spending in a very unpredictable environment, 
while incorporating necessary precautions. The system has em­
phasized intensive informal coordination. Smallness and other 
factors have facilitated its relatively successful operation.
One can. —f ra,me the discussion >by. as in g Conyers 1 list 
(1985) to note the main varieties of rural "regional planning" that 
are present: (i) the disaggregation of national sectoral plans; i.e. 
their constitution by specifically located projects and programmes; 
(ii) district-level coordination of the various programmes; includ­
ing in the major case of drought relief; (iii) natural resources 
planning, to prepare and apply rural land-use plans; (iv) settlement 
planning, for hierarchies of centres and for major-village layouts. 
It is in the first two areas that the Botswana system is notably 
developed and can offer suggestions. Community planning and 
regional economic planning are weaker; and the project-enclave type 
of "integrated rural development" hasnot been adopted.
Section 4 looks at limitations and emerging strains in a system that 
has been strong on obtaining revenues from aid and exports, and 
deploying them to infrastructure and social services, but weaker on 
local mobilization and developing rural production and employment. 
One is interested to ask how far the problems here are inevitable, 
given the country's situation, and how far they reflect the nature 
of its decision-making institutions; and whether or not the local- 
level bodies which have been built up might help in these areas of 
weakness, despite the centrally perceived requirements for political 
and financial control. A range of different views on the ap­
propriate balance between centralization and decentralization will 
be presented.
Section 5 draws together the main themes in the discussion.
Evaluating an institutional setup and discerning themes of more 
general application are notoriously difficult. How far do elements 
of strength reflect good fortune and circumstances special to 
Botswana in a particular phase? Each country is a special case: 
Botswana is very small in population, arid or semi-arid, yet blessed 
with diamonds. One needs to provide a reasonably detailed account 
of both its circumstances and experiences in order to generate 
themes and suggestions. Readers can then consider how far those 
might carry'over to different circumstances. Referring to programme 
cases is helpful for readers to get some feel for the setting and 
for how far the themes fit the country itself, let alone others.
It is necessary too to look not just at institutions in isolation, 
but at a system of development management as a whole. The ways that 
organizations like District Councils operate can only be understood 
with reference to the organizations with which they interact, and to 
their whole environment, e.g. policies affecting whether they can 
retain good staff. In Botswana it is particularly important to look 
at the overall system, as district-level planning is quite in­
tegrated into national planning.
If one focused on local government alone one might see the last 
twenty years as the creation, plus erratic but ongoing development, 
of an interesting set of local authorities, and thus as a process of 
decentralization. From a wider viewpoint though one could give at 
least equal emphasis to the parallel creation of a larger and more 
powerful central government machinery. Before independence, in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate with its policy of extreme "benign 
neglect", there were fairly independent chiefs and a very decentral­
ized colonial field administration, with powerful District 
Commissioners (DCs). Around independence in 1966, the power of both 
chiefs and DCs was reduced; and the transferred power did not go in 
its entirety to new District Councils and Land Boards. For there 
emerged an interventionist - and centralized - central government. 
Central Government staff now outnumber those of local authorities in 
a ratio of three to one. Perhaps three quarters of central govern­
ment's permanent staff are in the towns; with possibly three fifths 
in Gaborone alone. Yet central government's permanent staff in 
rural areas are still equal in number to those of local authorities; 
and for "Industrial Class" labourers the centre's rural employees 
are twice as numerous as Councils'. [4]
While there is now an extensive literature on Botswana's planning 
systems and experiences, rather little has looked at the national 
and sub-national levels together and at their interrelations. Most 
has a national-level perspective, reflecting the dominance of 
central institutions (e.g. Colclough & McCarthy, 1980). The litera­
ture that is on sub-national agencies has concentrated on those in 
the Ministry of Local Government & Lands, and those they support or 
supervise, like Councils and Land Boards. There has not been equal 
attention to deconcentration {5] via the subnational activities of 
line Ministries (which account for around BOX of public development
6expenditure in the districts); nor to how decentralized activities 
are coordinated within the national planning system. The present 
paper tries to bridge some of those gaps in the literature.
2. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: INSTITUTIONS AND POWERS
"The Botswana Constitution provides for a unitary state; 
hence decentralisation in the context of Botswana is not 
of political power but of functions." (Department of 
Information and Broadcasting, 1986:29.)
2.1. Setting and leadership
Botswana is physically large (582,000 sq.km.) but with a small human 
population (around 1.2 million by 1988). The great majority of the 
people are found within 100 km. either side of the Zimbabwe to South 
Africa railway that runs from north to south along the eastern side 
of the country. These eastern areas have relatively better rainfall 
and soils, but are still a very difficult and drought-prone environ­
ment for arable agriculture. The areas have long depended heavily 
on cattle and on labour migration. Most of the west of the country 
is desert or semi-desert sandveld.
In Zimbabwean terms, it is as if one took the two provinces of 
Matabeleland, less Bulawayo, and added on a large and mineral-rich 
portion of the Kalahari (Kgalagadi). Apart from being landlocked, 
Botswana is fairly comparable to Namibia, in size, aridity, popula­
tion density and mineral wealth.
Reflecting the country's small population, there are only ten dis­
tricts, and no Provincial level exists between the national and 
district levels. [1] This makes it likely that centre-district 
communication and interaction can on average be easier and more 
intensive, and that some matters will be more, fully centralized, and 
others more fully decentralized, than in larger countries. 
Similarly, there are only ten ministries, which may ease 
coordination. This partly reflects a deliberate concern to keep the 
government machinery streamlined; there have been no changes in the 
Ministry line-up since 1973, despite the rapid economic and social 
changes.
The Botswana set-up is simple in these ways, but, relatively complex 
and differentiated in others. Rural local government has four parts 
: District Councils, Tribal Administration, District Administration, 
and Land Boards. Their roles are explained later in section 2. 
There is an active multi-party system, though the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) has held central government power con­
tinuously in the independence era. The BDP espouses a mixed economy
without comprehensive State control. There is also a range of non­
profit non-government development organizations (e.g. brigades; van 
Rensburg, 1984).
This institutional pluralism was the choice of a shrewd, as well as 
fortunate, political leadership; in particular of two men, Seretse 
Khama and Quett Masire, the founders of the BDP. The BDP coalition 
followed neither the traditional chiefly structures (unlike e.g. 
Swaziland), nor the substitute ubiquity of nationalist movements 
like TANU/CCM, UNIP and ZANU. Its leading members have been from 
the larger cattle-owners and the new salaried and professional 
classes. In a rural country with exceptionally unequal distribu­
tions of income and assets, it has in general been able to rely on, 
or ensure, the votes of the masses. Picard (1987) draws an analogy 
to Kenya's "no-party state", where party structures are-mainly 
active at elections. He suggests that, in the absence of deep party 
penetration or new traditions, older rural forms thus remain fairly 
important.
Some authors suggest that independent Botswana has been the closest 
current approximation to Weber's "administrative State" (Gunderson, 
1971; Picard, 1979a). The small group of politicians has been 
largely content to determine the parameters, structures and bound­
aries of government action. They leave a high proportion of policy- 
definition and routine allocation to their bureaucrats, who 
inherited and retained a high colonial status. It is a "board-of- 
directors" approach. Picard argues that the BDP was accepted by the 
British from 1962 as a post-independence government, and acquired 
this directorial style in relation to expatriate bureaucrats during 
the -1962-6 transition (1987:Ch.6). There is however now no major 
social difference between ministers and top civil servants; they 
have similar backgrounds and economic interests and mix frequently 
in the small capital city. Some leading Ministers are former civil 
servants.
The BDP feels no need to become the channel for most activities, or 
to have its own policy analysis structures to control government. 
It sees planners as better used in other ways, and the civil service 
as trustworthy. On major issues too, the role of civil servants to 
analyse and propose has not been curtailed or inhibited. The right 
to dispose stays with the politicians. They override the civil 
servants when they feel fundamental political or economic interests 
are at stake. [2]
The Accelerated Rural Development Programme of 1973-6 il­
lustrates politicans' minimum requirements, but also their 
commitment to a welfare capitalism. It is discussed in Box 2.
The stability of the delegated, administrative, style of decision­
making seems to reflect a society that has been relatively quiescent 
and unfractured. Tribal divisions are not very deep; and the scat­
tered Batswana had avoided some of the disruptions of settler 
colonialism, but stayed poor and peripheral up to the 1970s.
BOX 2 - THE ACCELERATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME OF 1973-76
Botswana entered independence as one of the poorest countries in the 
world. Half the recurrent budget and all the capital budget were 
covered by British grants (though these had only become substantial 
from the mid-50s). The first two National Development Plans (1968/73 
and 1970/5) included rather little that would reach the bulk, of the 
rural population. In the early 1970s rural areas received less than 
10% of government investment (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980, Ch.4.)
With the favourable 1969 renegotiation of the terms of the Southern 
African Customs Union, and opening-up of the Orapa diamond mine, 
real GDP grew by 22% p.a. from 1968/9 to 1973/4 (Isaksen, 1981:10)  ^
The government— initiated— various-discussions on-rural development 
strategy. In particular a 1973 report by Robert Chambers and David 
Feldman made a series of proposals. The recommended changes in 
national strategy were not accepted (e.g. to give less priority to 
urban development, and to reject an approach of growth-maximization 
plus spin-offs); but some programme suggestions were taken up 
(Picard, 1979a & 1980). These included the formalization of the 
district planning system (to be seen in section 3.3 below); the 
Tribal Grazing Land Policy (2.3 below); and major extensions of 
physical infrastructure in rural areas. On this last front the 
Government took immediate and dramatic action.
The 1974 general election was approaching. In the 1969 election some 
rural seats had been lost by the ruling party, including the seat of 
the Vice President. In November 1973 the Cabinet announced the 
Accelerated Rural Development Programme. As in other countries after 
independence, the overriding purpose was to create visible results 
by the date of the election. It was given official priority over 
other programmes. "We were told: Don't worry about the money, we 
will give it to you as you need it" (a council official). [3] "We 
were shattered actually at the speed with which they intended to act 
and then did act" (a central government official); "Services were 
pushed further out into the rural areas"; "We learnt about villages 
we had never been" (a contractor). The National Plan's pessimistic 
rural construction targets were left far behind. [4] However, in 
several cases the rushed designs were poor, and "costs generally 
were high"; nor was there much self-help. Small contractors seemed 
to provide the best value; by encouraging them, "The ARDP.... 
developed the national capacity to build". The election was duly won 
- "Since the ARDP we feel there has been an equal share" (a District 
Commissioner) - but the programme carried on for another 18 months 
to allow completion of projects that had entered the pipeline. The 
leadership were impressed by the physical as well as the political 
results, and have remained committed to rural investment programmes. 
Equally interesting is that there have been no comparable crash 
programmes since, other than drought relief. Instead: "We are more 
or less a permanent ARDP now" (anon.). [5]
Next, independent Botswana has shown extraordinary economic growth. 
At first this involved beef exports and the effective use of aid. 
Since 1973 it has involved the export of diamonds, which has become 
dominant in the 1980s thanks to the new Jwaneng mine. Fortunately 
diamonds were not found before 1948, which could have brought incor­
poration into South Africa [7]; nor before there existed a local 
system ready to effectively handle the revenue. There has been good 
management, as well as good, fortune. Zambian experience was one 
influence. Botswana has been able to implement rapidly, without 
attempting to do more than is prudent. It had already earned this 
reputation before major diamonds production came on stream (Jones, 
1977). Government now obtains in theory perhaps three-quarters of 
the diamonds revenue. Large financial reserves are held; and there 
is a marked absence of prestige projects. New government buildings, 
the enlarged national stadium, and the new international airport 
have all remained distinctly modest, so far. Air Botswana does not 
pursue major lossmaking routes or jumbo aircraft.
At least to date, rapid growth has been more a source of political 
stability than of instability. Public demands have not pressed 
desperately hard on the operation or practices of the bureaucracy. 
The government may even have kept ahead of the effective demand in 
some areas, by putting heavy emphasis on provision of public goods 
and on public sector wages and salaries. "The rural poor...are not 
as yet voicing demands for a greater share of resources and a 
greater say in decision-making" (Tsiane & Youngman, 1986:ix). 
Senior officials typically earn substantial incomes from cattle or 
other businesses, and so have less need to pursue material ambitions 
through government office. Official corruption and nepotism are 
reported to be low.
Given this relatively relaxed political environment, the prominence 
of aid and of expatriates furthered an administrative style of 
orderly planning. Botswana has been near the top of the recipient 
league for ability to spend aid to donors' satisfaction; and in the 
1970s it received 5x the African average for per capita aid 
(Tsaksen, 198-1:14). [9]
High growth, high aid, great initial backwardness, and careful 
government calculation led to an exceptional continuing expatriate 
presence. Besides its other pros and cons, this arguably may have 
affected local consumption aspirations. Expatriates have on the 
whole been technocrats responding to the opportunities of a chal­
lenging and dynamic setting. In general they neither would nor 
could question the political frame. This allowed a classic division 
of powers, with the technocrats accorded great freedom within their 
own domains.
2.2 Central Ministries
The Botswana equivalent of a Planning Ministry or Agency is the 
Division of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning (MFDP). Through its deep involvement in 
budgeting and the issuing of funds it wields greater power than if 
it just produced documents and advised other Ministries (notably a 
separate Finance Ministry). Its power also rests on the consistent 
backing of the President. From 1966 to 1971 the Minister of 
Development Planning was the Vice President, Quett Masire - the No.2 
to Khama ever since the formation of the BDP. In 1971 he became 
Minister of Finance & Development Planning, in an enlarged Ministry. 
In 1980 Masire himself became President. His first Vice President 
was~ Lenyelet-se Seretse, the cousin of Khama; but on Seretse's death 
Masire returned the Vice Presidency in 1983 to the Finance & 
Development Planning Minister, now Peter Mmusi.
MFDP dominates public sector resource allocation. The Office of the 
President is in principle superior, but delegates most of this work. 
It preempts resources for the Botswana Defence Force, but even the 
other agencies under its wing (e.g the Police) have not always 
escaped pressures from the economists. Its Directorate of Personnel 
liaises closely with MFDP in manpower allocation. The same applies 
for the Bank of Botswana in monetary policy. Amongst sectoral 
Ministries, only Agriculture has sufficient political connections to 
sometimes operate independently or counterpunch effectively. 
Commerce & Industry suffers the indignity of MFDP dominating commer­
cial and industrial policy, and even the administration of the 
Financial Assistance Policy for new enterprises. Councils are very 
heavily dependent on central government funding.. [1]
The preeminence of MFDP is marked in various ways. Its Permanent 
Secretary ranks above other Permanent Secretaries, and below only 
the Head of the Civil Service. His deputies, including the Director 
of Economic Affairs, have the same rank as Permanent Secretaries in 
other Ministries. The Director of Economic Affairs in particular 
wields considerable power compared to his counterparts in many 
countries. The same applies to several of the economists in the 
large Planning Officer cadre, which he heads. MFDP HQ economists 
have often retained effective veto power, even on matters of detail.
The Planning Officer cadre also covers the Ministry Planning Units. 
These units have an important role in communication between sector 
departments and the central controllers; and, more broadly, in 
interrelating sector needs and information with national conditions, 
connections and priorities. They can talk relatively easily with 
both sides, to understand viewpoints, obtain information and exert 
influence. In the case of the Local Government Ministry, the 
Planning Unit's liaison work is especially between Districts and the 
centre. [2]
Ministries strongly represented at District and sub-District level 
include , Agriculture, Education, Health, Water, and Works & 
Communications. The degree of deconcent rated power varies: for 
example a Regional Roads. Maintenance Engineer is a fairly senior 
professional, with significant discretion within a large budget, in 
contrast to the head of a local Buildings depot. District officials 
often complain of the unresponsiveness of Ministries, at both na­
tional and local levels. There is undoubtedly some truth in these 
perennial laments, yet is hard to know overall exactly how much 
weight to attach to them. (One famous example concerned Veterinary 
Services' construction of nationwide cordon fences without local 
consultation; but this was admittedly during an epidemic.) [3]
The Department of Town and Regional Planning (DTRP), in the Ministry 
of Local Government and Lands, seeks to apply a perception.of—spa­
tial. coherence onto these sectoral Ministry activities. It has had 
less power and centrality than its counterparts in some countries 
(e.g. Zimbabwe), especially as compared to the Finance and Planning 
Ministry. . Town-and-regionalism came late to the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate, which was not averse to zoning or legal restrictions 
but had little scope to practice them:- (then) only two small towns, 
simple (and hard to affect) regional and settlement patterns, and 
not much of a private sector to control. In contrast, the finance 
men have always been powerful, whether when seeking to minimize 
budgets or to maximize how far budgets go; and their power increased 
when they joined with the economists, especially as so much of 
Botswana's new revenues passed directly to Government rather than to 
a private sector. [4]
In addition, to DTRP,,; the Ministry of Local Government and Lands 
(MLGL) contains:- the Department of Surveys and Lands; the Food 
Resources.. Department which handles the bulk of drought relief; the 
Unified Local Government Service, which manages local authorities' 
permanent personnel; and the Local Government Audit Department.
The Ministry headquarters includes the usuaL administrative 
officers, Finance Unit, Planning Unit, and a prolific Applied 
Research Unit, but no Statistics Unit. Egner comments that, by 
having been the only Ministry to publish no annual statistics, let 
alone disaggregated statistics, MLGL has happened to.minimize the 
scope for informed criticism of its allocations (1987:127). In the 
1980s a Technical Services Division has been built up to support 
local authorities in civil and health engineering and in construc­
tion work. The specifically rural section of headquarters comes 
under a Deputy Permanent" Secretary (DPS). It includes,the Lands 
Division, which services the inter-ministry Lands Development 
Committee, and supervises Land Boards; and an Under Secretary for 
District Plans, who chairis the inter-ministry District Plans 
Committee. There is also an urban and housing section, under 
another DPS.
MLGL is concerned to control local authorities as well as support or 
strengthen them. It will, says the National Plan, "work towards
encouraging greater decentralization of decision-making", rather 
than simply work towards it or encourage it; whereas it also aims, 
more forcefully, to "provide effective representation of central 
government at urban and rural levels and coordinate local authority 
activities through an effective District Administration machinery" 
(Botswana, 1985:77).
2.3 District Administration, Tribal Administration,
Land Boards
"The District Administration...consists of an admini­
strative section which ensures that harmony prevails 
in the district". (Department of Information &
Broadcasting, 1986:27.)
Each District Administration in Botswana contains not just a 
District Commissioner (DC) and generalist District Officers. It 
also has specialists, including the District Officer (Development) 
and the District Officer (Lands) - DO(D) and DO(L). This system is 
felt to have been valuable, and has been extended.
In 1966 DCs lost some of their authority to the new elected District 
Councils. It was proposed that they move towards a development role 
and away from political control. They should coordinate and check 
on the work of the new or newly active sectoral development minis­
tries. District Development Coirimittees (DDCs) chaired by the DC 
were established in 1970. So Councils did not acquire preeminence 
as the District development authority. The new demands on DCs 
coincided though with rapid localization of the cadre and yet the 
drawing away- of better qualified citizen administrators into the 
burgeoning central government (Picard, 1979a). A new post was 
needed, for an executive secretary to the DDC - the D0(D). MFDP 
insisted that this development coordination role required a good 
quality graduate, and preferably an economist. This implied the use 
of expatriates for a period (which proved to be -about a dozen 
years). The presence of expatriates, and the creation in 1971 of 
its own Planning Unit, helped MLGL to successfully demand that the 
D0(D)s report to it in the first instance, and not directly to MFDP. 
In 1975 D0(L)s were added, especially for implementation of the 
Tribal Grazing Land Policy.
While Councils were not granted primacy, the DC was still weaker 
than before. The District Development Committee is primarily' only 
advisory, and - perhaps wisely - DCs tended to stick to their formal 
authority. Those who were more forceful were usually promoted out. 
In 1979 the Local Government Structure Commission recommended that 
DCs should concentrate solely on development work and become 
District Development Directors, at a higher grade than before. 
Central government accepted the need for higher grading, but in­
sisted on retaining an all-purpose representative at district level. 
The DC remained with a miscellany of duties; including in drought
relief, general political supervision, and reporting on the Tribal 
Administration (Picard, 1985).
Botswana's way of handling the transition from - yet harnessing of - 
traditional political authority has been to leave the chiefs with a 
formal status and a few remaining powers. Most of these are in 
principle derived from their government appointment as "tribal 
administrators". There is a hierarchy of such appointments, each 
with indicated powers and duties; and some support staff. State 
supervision of chiefs increased from the 1930s, with for example the 
imposition of accounting requirements; but even advisory tribal 
councils did not become mandatory until 1957. These were the 
forerunners of the District Councils established in 1966, which took, 
some of the Tribal Administration staff, facilities and powers. The 
chiefs are ex-officio members of District Councils, and in some 
cases are very prominent (Tordoff, 1988). Apart from their remain­
ing role in tribal ceremonial, they still administer the customary 
courts (on lines now re-established in Zimbabwe in 1988) and preside 
over the traditional village fora, the kgotlas.
These fora have probably declined, especially near towns and in the 
major villages, but are often still influential compared to newer 
institutions (Inger, 1986; Thothe, 1986). However women, youth and 
Basarwa, let alone the absentee population, play little or no role 
in the kgotla; and discussion seems to centre on requests for pal­
liative social infrastructure (Noppen, 1982; Sterkenburg, 1987.)
The Tribal Administration has largely been ignored in development 
programmes, despite - or perhaps because of - meaning more to most 
of the rural population than do the Councils (Picard, 1985; Egner, 
1986; Tordoff, 1988).
As part of downgrading of the old system, the kgotlas are sup­
posed to elect separate Village Development Committees (VDCs). The 
VDC is then to promote community development, identify the needy, 
and liaise with village voluntary groups, the Council and local 
officials, in particular with the village and district extension 
teams. VDC boundaries often diverge from those of the kgotlas, and 
committee members are unpaid. Their record reads similarly to that 
in many countries. In 1979 half the VDCs were defunct, and only a 
quarter met regularly. No part of government appeared to pay them 
great attention, not even the Councils (Reilly, 1981:39). They 
became more active in the 1980s' drought relief programmes; but are 
reportedly still, generally weak (as are many of the extension teams) 
and often in conflict with chiefs and councillors (Tsiane & 
Youngman, eds., 1986). Arguably they might be more effective if 
linked further to a strengthened Tribal Administration; but, under­
standably, government has resisted such suggestions.
BOX 3 - LAND BOARDS AND THE TRIBAL GRAZING LAND POLICY
Facing the demanding task of land allocation in a rapidly commer­
cializing rural economy, the supposedly administrative Land Boards 
possessed little professional capacity (Picard & Morgan, 1985). 
During 1965-75 large cattle owners responded to lucrative beef 
export markets by making an effective land grab in new areas (mainly 
those going vest into the Kalahari). Infant Land Boards endorsed the 
establishment by the big men of boreholes in these grazing lands. 
Since boreholes had to be 8km. apart, and there are no other reli­
able water sources, this in effect gave each borehole owner control 
over a huge area (Colclough, & McCarthy, 1980).
In 1975 this process was halted and a new Tribal Grazing Land Policy 
(TGLP) was announced. A nationwide consultation was undertaken, 
after the policy details had.already been set by Cabinet (Picard, 
1980; Noppen, 1982). The policy's provisions included zoning of the 
tribal lands, into new commercial ranches and remaining communal 
lands. Creation of ranches was supposed to reduce land pressure in 
the old communal lands, by transferring large owners' cattle out to 
the nev lands. Within the remaining communal lands, measures of 
improved land management would then be undertaken. This complex and 
controversial programme was to be administered by the Land Boards, 
supported by the new D0(L)s. Yet the D0(L) cadre was unavoidably 
staffed by short-term expatriates, almost without exception! Not 
until 1981 was a major attempt made to establish training for Land 
Board members and their staffs (Picard & Morgan, 1985:148), but by 
1985 hardly any had been trained (Botswana, 1985:85).
TGLP has involved granting (astonishingly cheap) commercial ranch 
leases to those. who had staked out their boreholes in the early 
1970s. It was in part the consolidation of the land grab. Lands were 
surveyed only after the policy was announced. The survey established 
that the land grab had covered nearly all available additional areas 
which had economical potential water supply (See e.g. Sandfoird 1980, 
Picard 1980 & 1987.) Earlier overestimation of the land surplus no 
doubt contributed to the easy endorsement of the policy at the time.
The ranch lease conditions have hardly been enforced, so that many 
large owners continue to use communal area grazing lands when 
convenient. Whether it has involved incapacity or bias, the weakness 
of the Land Boards has thus been to the interest of large cattle 
owners. Since these include amongst their numbers most politicians 
and senior Batswana civil servants, Picard & Morgan suggest that it 
is unlikely to have been an oversight. Reilly (1983) noted that many 
Councillors too are large cattle owners; but adds that these would 
have preferred to place land administration directly under the 
Councils. It should be stated that some of the initially proposed 
commercial areas were dezoned; and the very slow implementation may 
sometimes have reflected Land Board disquiet and popular discontent.
After being removed from the chiefs, land allocation was placed 
under separate Land Boards, not the elected Councils. There are 12 
Land Boards and 35 sub-Boards, still reflecting tribal corporate 
identities. The Boards typically consisted of the chief and another 
Tribal Administration official, two councillors selected by the 
Council, and. two central appointees, plus non-voting advisory 
members. MLGL and, in theory, Councils were to set principles, but 
actual allocation is by the Boards. They have with time become more 
independent of both chiefs and Councils. Chiefs have recently been 
assigned instead to a Customary Court of Appeal; this handles per­
sistent customary land disputes, rather than have them pass through 
Land Boards.
In respect of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy, the Land Boards to 
date can be seen from one viewpoint as an example of the limits to, 
and failure of, the planning system in Botswana. (See Box 3.) The 
gradually growing land-use control capacity in the 1980s has been 
concentrated upon more politically manageable matters in the remain­
ing communal lands.
2.4 District Councils
"In the light of the [listed] shortcomings, it seems control
by Central Government over local authorities is inevitable.
Controls have to be reduced as administrative capacity
increases" (Dintwa - Under Sec. [Rural], MLGL; 1986:10).
When District Councils in Botswana were created in 1966, the year of 
independence, it was thought that they would in time take over fully 
from the District Administration. Within a few years central 
government had misgivings. Ministries doubted Councils' competence 
and, especially after the 1969 elections, ruling politicians became 
concerned at the potential development of centres of opposition and 
criticism - e.g. around disgruntled chiefs, or even in Councils 
controlled by the ruling party. Picard suggests that MFDP even 
proposed to abolish the Councils, as had been done in Kenya (Picard, 
1987:171).
The new District Development Committees were placed outside the 
Councils. In 1973-4 Councils (and Land Boards) lost powers of 
appointment, placement and promotion over their own permanent 
salaried staffs. (Councils still control their Industrial Class 
labourers.) These powers passed to a Unified Local Government 
Service (ULGS); and a Unified Teaching Service took over the primary 
school teachers. Unified services reduced the danger of tribalism, 
and offered more attractive career structures.
The District Councils have however retained important 
responsibilities. They are the endorsing authority for the District 
Plans produced by DDCs. More substantively, they have statutory 
responsibility for the provision and operation of facilities for
primary health care and primary education, in consultation with the 
relevant Ministries; for non-gazetted roads and village water sup­
plies and sanitation (but with sector Ministries handling much of 
the initial construction); and for community development and social 
welfare. Councils contain not just Treasurers and general ad­
ministrators, but also Works Departments, Planning Officers, and - 
increasingly in the 1980s - other professionals. Their respon­
sibility for community development might imply that this area is 
given low weight at present, but it still carries a potential sig­
nificance (Reilly, 1983:154ff.). And in general, Councils' 
sustained presence provides a basis for further developments.
In many African countries elected District Councils with significant 
functions were simply displaced (e.g. in Kenya, Lesotho and 
Tanzania). Their continuation in Botswana needs to be explained. 
Picard (1979b, 1987) suggests that Councils lacked any negative 
associations with the colonial era, thanks to their late appearance. 
The political culture considers limited expression of opposition to 
be functional as well as acceptable, and is not prone to drastic 
reorganizations. Complaints are common because they can be freely 
made; though compared to some other countries the working relations 
between Councils and the Ministries appear fairly good (see e.g. 
Wallis, 1987). Central management of Council staffs, plus 
Councillors' weak formal education, may also leave them reassuringly 
dependent and oriented to the centre. (Dintwa notes that: "The 
relationship between Councillors and Staff is far from
ideal....there are often conflicts due to lack of understanding of
their roles"; 1986:8.) Government has also had the power to appoint 
a proportion of Councillors; and has not faced the test of a mainly 
opposition set of Councils. Finally, Councils have survived long 
enough to become appreciated as a useful service-delivery channel.
Councils surprised many people by their implementation capacities in 
the 1973-6 Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP), espe­
cially in building classrooms, health facilities, and housing for 
teachers and civil servants. ARDP also "increased the capacity and 
credibility of District Councils and competence and confidence of 
Council staff", through their experience' of managing many projects. 
[1] "The Council's success in solving the logistical problems 
amazed me" (anon.). "The normal slippage on which we depend did not 
occur" (a finance officer). Extra workload was handled not just by 
extra hours but also by upgrading management systems. "We are aware 
now that there is local government" (a professional officer in 
central government). "It broke down a lot of psychological 
barriers" (anon.).
In his official evaluation, Chambers found himself more impressed on 
the whole than he had expected to be with this crash programme. But 
he argued that what was needed next was not another ARDP - "It was a 
building programme. I do not think it was a development programme" 
(anon.). Other authors have suggested that top-down building 
programmes undermined village-level interest in self-help, both then
and since (Inger, 1986). Chambers stressed that infrastructural 
achievements alone do not guarantee the effective provision of 
services, especially in remote areas. Recurrent and manpower inputs 
are also needed. Here he recommended more devolution, and block 
grants to local authorities; use of poverty rankings in project 
appraisals; and a special poverty-oriented programme for the NDP IV 
period, 1976-81. Amongst other things what happened next though was 
implementation of the inegalitarian Tribal Grazing Lands Policy; 
plus indeed the top-down provision of much more physical and social 
infrastructure in rural areas. Major upgrading of Councils had to 
wait for some years.
A series of reports in the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated that 
Councils had serious shortcomings in their more regular operation. 
[2] The average quality of Councillors was low; able and educated 
men had more promising outlets. Seventy percent of permanent 
Council staff were not qualified for the posts they held, in terms 
of the official Schemes of Service. This was hardly surprising, 
given the near-total lack of spending on education before the 1960s. 
Job descriptions and procedures were inadequate; and in-service 
training was limited and ad hoc, often just a reward for seniority 
(Higgins, 1987). Qualified and competent staff were liable to be 
speedily transferred between Councils, in fire-brigade fashion; and 
to soon leave for other sectors. (The same applied for Land 
Boards.) The ULGS (though not the Unified Teaching Service) was 
marred by poor relations between its central controllers, the con­
trolled staff, and Councillors; and consultation with ministries, 
chiefs and the public was also weak (Sarpong, 1978; Reilly, 1983). 
Staff deficiencies were most serious in technical areas and finance. 
Audit reports were heavy with criticism, year after year; but the 
system of accountability was flawed, for the supervisory agency and 
recipient of the reports - MLGL - was itself deeply implicated in 
Councils' financial administration, by its continual and thoroughgo­
ing interventions, and its control of Council staff. District 
Councils had little independent revenue base, especially after 
central government made primary education free. In 1979/80 50% of 
even their recurrent budgets were covered by central grants, up from 
20% in 1973/4.
The 1979 Local Government Structure Commission (LGSC) concluded that 
Councils had too limited capacity for any further devolution to be 
realistic at that time. It also argued that the quadri-partite 
local government system should be kept, with an important role for 
each of the bodies, and the dominance of none. There was little to 
be gained, and perhaps much to be lost, by putting all four parts 
under a single umbrella, whether it be that of the District 
Administration or Council. Unification does not make differences of 
interest or problems of coordination vanish, and it can reduce the 
channels for participation and mutual supervision. The Commission 
chairman argued elsewhere that disagreements between bodies are not 
necessarily wasteful, provided there are mechanisms for discussion 
and resolution; and that unifying all the bodies, under the Council,
could increase the possibility of some charismatic chiefs becoming 
locally dominant, and in general raise the danger of District-Centre 
conflict (Tordoff, 1978).
After reviewing the reports, central government agreed that all four 
institutions should be kept; and that Councils should be upgraded, 
not downgraded. It ruled that upgrading should be basically ad­
ministrative, i.e. by giving more training rather than more 
authority; and that continuing and even strengthened central control 
was required. The LGSC recommendations to give Districts an 
automatic share of some central revenues were rejected, as were 
Districts' own revenue-raising proposals. The ceiling on local 
government tax was kept very low.
Some important changes occurred between the late 70s and the mid 
80s. A Local Authorities Finance Unit was established in MLGL HQ, 
to . support Councils. The number of staff in post in District 
Councils rose by 18% p.a. in 1978-86 (Egner, 1986:42). This covered 
even Council Works Departments, and their technical staff; at the 
same time the MLGL HQ technical support unit was created and 
expanded. Some Councils acquired extra planning officers. A large 
programme of Council staff training began in 1983, supported in 
particular by SIDA. The impact of these changes will be considered 
in Section 4.
3. THE SYSTEMS OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
3.1 Flexible plans with legal authority; the integration of 
development plans, budgets, and project planning
Having described institutions we can look at how they interact in 
the development programme. Government development planning in 
Botswana has been carefully formalized since around independence. 
Botswana was an impoverished nation, dependent until 1972 for out­
side support to cover even its recurrent budget. There was a 
premium on well-presented proposals and effective management, in 
order to attract outside resources. Once established, this system 
was maintained, even after finance alone had become less of a 
constraint. As a result, foreign donors have remained enthusiastic.
The formalization of development planning in Botswana is seen in 
various ways. Apart from the standard professional cadres, such as 
urban & regional planners, there are the large cadres of economist 
Planning Officers, of District Officers (for Development and for 
Lands) and Council Planning Officers. [1] The first edition of the 
Botswana "Planning Officers Manual" appeared in 1976. The third 
edition (1986) runs to 230 pages and is even on open sale, as being 
of wide interest and high quality, and as part of citizen 
information. Several other planning handbooks for specialist cadres 
have long been in use; including the equally detailed District
Planning Handbook (Local Govt. & Lands, 1978). Very many detailed 
reports have been commissioned and published (e.g. Lipton, 1978).
The medium-term National Development Plans are better prepared, 
written and presented than those of most developing countries, let 
alone of countries of similar size. The Plan for 1985-91, like its 
predecessors, is a formidable volume of over 400 double-columned 
pages, replete with tables and photographs. Published promptly in 
1985, it includes around 100 pages systematically describing every 
project in the development programme. Plans have been based on a 
two-year phased interchange between the Cabinet, Ministries, 
Departments and Districts; and have then carried real weight within 
Government, nationally, and with international agencies. They act 
as basic reference sources on conditions, developments, strategy, 
sectors and projects. District medium-term Plans have been 
similarly substantial documents, not mimeoed shopping lists.
Are these stage-props of planning in Botswana actually useful? The 
simplest test is persistence:- one might expect that if they were 
all show and no delivery then after one or two cycles they would 
have fallen into decline. Instead, the system has had not just an 
ability to produce documents but also relatively high effectiveness, 
because of strong political backing, and realism plus flexibility in 
design, including its definite links between medium-term and project 
planning and annual budgeting. Plans have been more than detailed 
reviews plus statements of intentions. They have also been parts of 
a system of development management, which deserves examination as 
one key to why sector Ministries and local authorities have been 
able to on the whole act rapidly yet effectively. [5]
The Plan constrains the annual development budget, but can be up­
dated simultaneously with it. It also constrains the project 
approval process but does not fully preempt it, for that process can 
respond to new information. An outline of the mechanisms is given 
in Box 4. This system of ordered flexibility is-a sophisticated 
interpretation of the possibilities for planning in an environment 
of extreme unpredictability. (One must add that the system is also 
popular with MFDP since it allows it to retain a large degree of 
discretion.) There is major uncertainty concerning rainfall, cattle 
diseases, refugee influxes and foreign aid; and Botswana is a nar­
rowly based and highly open economy which faces a fluctuating world 
market for its dominant export, as well as the ever present danger 
of squeeze and destabilization from South Africa. Caiden & 
Wildavsky's celebrated study (1974) described the problems with 
planning and budgeting in these sorts of conditions: Botswana 
experience suggests that, there can be partial solutions to the 
problems. (Allan & Hinchliffe, 1982, give a similar analysis of 
another instructive case.)
The tight link between planning and budgeting ensures the relevance 
of planning and the direction of budgeting. The planning system 
also emphasises systematic processing and appraisal of government
projects, again because so many macro-variables are beyond govern­
ment's control. Attempts at comprehensive planning would be 
misplaced - as opposed to making forecasts, on various sets of 
assumptions. This is almost obvious for a tiny open economy, but 
may also hold true for many larger, but still ope and fragile, 
African “economies- - especially in the turbulent 1980s ind,- no doubt, 
1990s. Such countries might have been misled by tht planning ap­
proaches attempted earlier in vast and largely closed economies like 
the USSR, India and China.
The project planning system is itself realistic in its emphases, 
trying to obtain information on vital aspects of project conception, 
organization, and feasibility, rather than stressing rate-of-return 
calculations which may be based on partial and unreliable 
information. Various checklists and simplified guidelines are also 
used.
It is revealing that even a relatively well-staffed system has 
not adopted thoroughgoing cost-benefit analysis. The reasons are 
probably both logistical and political. Calculating social rates of 
return is time-consuming, skill-intensive and often indecisive (see 
Gasper, 1986). But even the proposals for simpler systematic valua­
tion have not been fully adopted (e.g. those made by Chambers, 1977, 
and Lipton, 1978; putting shadow prices on skilled and unskilled 
labour, and on benefits to poverty groups). To do so would both 
reduce the degree of discretion held by the central decision-makers, 
and sometimes run counter to their personal economic interests and 
beliefs. Major donor-funded projects however do often incorporate 
full-scale cost-benefit analyses; and - perhaps more importantly - 
donors' and domestic planners' analyses of social priorities usually 
play a significant role at programme design stage.
Two categories of indirect cost receive special emphasis: the recur­
rent financial expenditures and manpower allocations that are 
implied by projects. The abundance of funds in the hands of govern­
ment since the late 1970s brought the dangers of starving non­
government sectors of skilled manpower, and of building-in recurrent 
government commitments which might not be sustainable in future 
economic, environmental or regional crises. It was decided not to 
maximize current growth through increasing the reliance on ex­
patriate or immigrant manpower; indeed their numbers fell 
significantly after 1981. Detailed ceilings on government manpower 
have been defined and enforced since 1978. Recurrent budget ceilings 
are ' then set in view of these manpower ceilings, as well as of the 
revenue forecasts. In turn, the development budget is set subject 
to the constraints that the other two budget ceilings now put on the 
recurrent requirements that can be produced by new development 
projects. (There is of course some negotiation and iteration.)
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BOX 4 - RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL PLAN, BUDGETS AND PROJECTS
Development expenditures cannot legally be authorized unless they (i) come 
under a project heading and description already incorporated in the 
National Plan, and (ii) do not exceed the Plan's specified ceiling (the 
Total Estimated Cost - TEC) for authorizations under that heading. This 
set of headings, descriptions and ceilings is under regular review. [2] 
The main mechanisms of updating are incorporated in annual budgeting. As 
part of the development expenditure Estimates that are prepared each year 
one can update the legally binding project headings, descriptions and 
TECs, i.e. update the details of the Plan. This is done on the basis of 
an Annual Project Review. There is also the possibility of updating via 
Supplementary Estimates during sessions of the House of Assembly.
The approved annual Development Estimates usually indicate more expendi­
ture than the Finance and Planning Ministry expects or will accept. From 
experience it knows that significant shortfalls will occur, and feels it 
can roughly predict their overall extent but not their exact distribution. 
Ministries and Councils prove unable to in total spend as much in projects 
as they hope to., due to implementation constraints of many types, includ­
ing problems in reaching agreement with donors. [3]
This "overplanning" is not reckless. Requests for development funds must 
do more than refer to the Plan and Estimates. They must provide a 
detailed project memorandum (or refer to an already accepted one), which 
must be found both adequate and feasible given the current availability of 
funds. [4] For the annual development Estimates to grant spending
authority they would have to be based on full project details, presented 
in the middle of the preceding financial year, a year or so earlier than 
is required under the more flexible project memorandum system.
In addition, the annual Development Estimates’ exact figures for expected 
expenditures in the current year do not even constitute necessary grounds 
for release of funds to spending Ministries. They are indicative but not 
binding. Ministries which can spend faster will not necessarily be 
prevented from doing so, provided they stay within (or obtain authorized 
amendment of) the Plan description and TEC for that project, and meet the 
general criteria of project adequacy. The system is geared to not slowing 
up spending, in a situation where one cannot predict in advance just when 
and where it will be possible or will be delayed.
In the late 70s and early 80s funds committed on the basis of an 
approved project memorandum could be for the estimated expenditures over a 
number of years, not just the current year, with a near-guarantee that 
funds could be carried over from one year to the next. This system 
depends on minimum predictable revenues not being too low, and on control­
lers being free from irrational fears. Letting Ministries spend above 
their annual Estimate for a:project as long as they stay within its Plan- 
period TEC has some dangers. It built up pressure for raising the TECs in 
easy-to-spend areas (usually urban) which may not be priorities. There 
 ^ has lately been a slight change. MFDP now sets a ceiling for each
Ministry; a project's TEC can only be increased if the Ministry is below 
l its ceiling or is willing to cut another project (Botswana, 1935:73).
Here again budgeting and development project planning are 
interconnected. Economists have been just as much involved in 
setting the recurrent and manpower ceilings as have financial and 
personnel administrators; and all project documents are required to 
spell out their implications for recurrent finance and manpower. 
The system has-been rather cumbersome, and-imperfect in its detailed 
workings (e.g. in sometimes trying to rule on each individual new 
post rather than just on ceilings by category). However, giving 
careful attention to these key areas has no doubt been better than 
ignoring them. [6]
3.2 District development planning system
"..not only seems to work but should provide a valuable 
model for other countries ...[It] is simple...based on 
practical experience....[and] uses existing institutions 
...not...new forms of organisation; [and it has 
important political support,] although..not always...as 
enthusiastic as it might have been" (Reilly, 1981:28).
The district planning system is supposed to link together all the 
district-level agents - i.e. to blend deconcentration and devolution 
- and connect them with the national planning set-up. The main 
claims made for this system are not so much as a machinery for 
participation from village level, but more as a system of coordina­
tion from district and sub-district level upwards. There is a lack 
of formal published research on the impact of the system. 
Discussion of its effectiveness has to be somewhat impressionistic.
At district level, the planning system officially centres on the 
District Development Committee. This is chaired by the DC, and 
includes representatives of Council, and relevant NGOs and central 
Government departments present at District level. The District 
Officer (Development) is the executive secretary, carrying main 
responsibility for the preparation, promotion and monitoring of 
annual and medium-term District Plans. He/she works under the DC, 
but also routinely reports to MLGL HQ, especially the Planning Unit. 
He/she should naturally work closely with the Council Planning 
Officer(s), who are concerned with detailed planning and implementa­
tion of projects undertaken through Councils. The DC and Council 
Secretary are designated "joint District Plan managers", to report 
to the DDC.
The DDC has a number of sub-committees. These can vary between 
districts, but always include the following:- Production Development 
Committee [1]; Extension Teams to coordinate extension and consult­
ation activities [2]; Land Use Planning Advisory Group (or Unit; 
LUPAG) [3]; and a District Drought Committee, usually chaired by the 
DC. In the 1980s districts have also proceeded with planning of
"Communal First Development Areas" (CFDAs). These are parts of the
communal lands in the district, where programmes will be con­
centrated for some years. Sub-districts are being established if 
necessary. The new CFDA coordinator post takes over main respon­
sibility for this work from DO(D)s and D0(L)s.
The DDC does not allocate resources, with a few exceptions, (notably 
under drought relief). It seeks to influence and coordinate the 
activities of other agencies:- central Ministries, District 
Administration, Council and VDCs, Land Boards, NGOs and the private 
sector. These obtain funds independently of the DDC. Ministry 
departments (including in MLGL) apply, via their Ministry head­
quarters, to MFDP; project-by-project. Ve noted that they still 
provide 80% of development expenditure in the districts.
VDCs can make project proposals to Councils or DDCs. Councils and 
Land Boards apply project-by-project to MLGL HQ, which can approve 
some small expenditures or within programmes which have already been 
approved in detail. Otherwise the approval of MFDP is also 
required. The amounts available as block grants for District al­
location to VDCs are very small in total amount (Botswana, 1985:78). 
NGO funds are therefore important for small village projects. 
Attempts are made to ensure that these projects too are reviewed by 
Council and the DDC (Segodi, 1988).
Prescribed operation of the overall system - including on financial 
and programme planning for Councils - is described in a District 
Planning Handbook of over 200 pages. It has received favourable 
outside comments, for its clear presentation and its emphasis on 
practical procedures.
While to a large extent the procedures for planning and budgeting of 
locally controlled projects are the same as those we described 
earlier for nationally controlled projects, one significant dif­
ference is in the case of major projects that are really programmes. 
Such "projects" consist of dozens of relatively small expenditures, 
divided between many locations in each district, as well as across 
districts. The major Council development expenditures, on primary 
school and health post construction and extension, have been of this 
type. The individual project components are too small and too 
numerous to be'treated individually at national level; yet central 
government considers the programmes to be too important in them­
selves and too costly in total for Councils to be given full 
control.
The system that is operated is similar to a recurrent budget. In 
effect a composite project for all Councils is prepared each year 
for each of the national project heads, such as primary school 
construction. Districts submit annual expenditure plans for these 
projects. They of course make reference to central guidelines, but 
the centre (MLGL and MFDP) can revise and trim the proposals.
Relatively small projects, of these types and others, can thus go 
through more clearance stages than comparable or larger central 
government projects:- they should be cleared by the VDC, and by 
Council's technical departments and Planning Unit and Council 
itself; by the DDC; then by MLGL, and MFDP; and sometimes also by a 
—donor -(-perhaps -even by -both local and -head offices). Funding in 
some areas was simplified from the late 70s, notably under SIDA's 
flexible District Development Sector Support programme-aid umbrella 
(DDSS). This gave the local SIDA office considerable powers of 
approval for projects under broadly specified headings.
Passage through so many levels inevitably gives some delays in 
expenditure. Approval may come after the start of the financial 
year; and only then can Councils start tendering projects - which is 
a major task on construction programmes that cover many small con­
tracts in scattered locations. Districts press for central 
government to commit funds for the medium-term, to aid forward 
planning and smooth implementation. But that runs counter to stan­
dard financial practice and the caution and convenience of central 
government, which likes to keep as much discretionary power as 
possible to itself. Projects which are really programmes, i.e. are 
highly divisible, offer considerable discretion and the option of 
being slowed down or accelerated according to changing conditions. 
There can be costs of proceeding in this cautious way. It is not 
easy to suddenly speed up a multi-part system; but the centre fears 
that it could become equally hard to slow it down. Conceivably 
central government could give medium-term commitments on priority 
expenditures, and leave the year-to-year uncertainties to fall on 
lower priority programmes. One problem here is the typical lack of 
consensus on priorities; every programme and every location feels 
that it is a priority.
District Plans do not have the legal status of National Plans. 
Government as a whole is required to take note rather than to ap­
prove or reject. However the central District Plans Committee does 
provide guidelines, reactions and vetting. It is chaired by MLGL, 
and includes MFDP representatives and Town & Regional Planning. 
Five-year District Plans were first prepared for 1973-78. These had 
limited direct influence, but did build up a data base and some 
experience. [4] The 1977-82 District Plans were a large-scale 
exercise, which took into account the 1976-81 National Plan and 
sought to elaborate and advance its contents at district-level. 
They reflected considerable village-level discussion. They also 
provided an input for the period 1979-82 into the subsequent . 1-979-85 
National Plan. Annual plans were then prepared, to break-down and 
up-date the medium-term plans; including by trying to reach a common 
understanding with ministries on their programme phasing. The onus 
in practice often lies on the District authorities to seek 
coordination. Progress reports are presented to DDC meetings. 
Action instructions are recorded from the meetings, typically re­
quiring or communicating information from or to various agencies. 
[5]
It will be apparent now that there are many types of planning going 
on at sub-national level. The discussions of "regional planning" 
can become confusing for this reason. *Ofie can u s e f u l l y  
review the different types, using the classification of varieties 
of regional-level planning that has been provided by Conyers (1985). 
In her -terms it appears that, at least compared to other countries, 
the Botswana system is relatively well developed in two areas:- the 
management of national sectoral programmes, as sets of project 
expenditures; and the district-level planning and negotiation that 
tries to improve the coordination between these programmes and with 
other activities.
3.3 Operating style and facilitating conditions
"The Botswana formula is specifically non-directive.
It complements, and does not conflict with, the normal
sectoral approach....[here, as elsewhere, the Botswana]
rule has been at all times to work through the system 
[and thus strengthen it]." (Leach, 1981:268)
Regional planning as negotiation is inherently demanding, in requir­
ing much liaison work; and frequently frustrating, in having only 
influence not control. There are standard complaints, both from 
busy ministry officials at being required to attend large meetings 
with long agendas which mostly hardly concern them, and from local 
government staff at the absence of central government officials. 
Whether frustration and disappointment outweigh achievement will 
depend on the energy and skill of the liaisers, the attitudes and 
interest of those they deal with, and on the criterion used: whether 
one sees all coordination as an improvement, or imperfect coordina­
tion as a tragedy. If one takes the non-tragic view, then the 
Botswana approach seems to have operated valuably - contrary to some 
expectations that regional planning must have fiscal or legal 
autonomy if it is to achieve anything. The work of many enthusias­
tic District Officers and council officers has had an influence on 
sectoral ministries: first, via their local staff, especially if
those have delegated powers; and secondly, directly, by correspon­
dence and visits (e.g. to Ministry Planning Units, especially the 
designated "District link-man")', and at the well-attended annual 
National District Development Conference (NDDC) and frequent other 
seminars and workshops (Reilly, 1981:44-6). [1]
One condition underlying reasonable operation of this system is that 
sub-national officers, even the district-level officers in a small 
country, sometimes have significant powers; and are eaisily acces­
sible rather than stuck away in. provincial centres. Integrated 
Rural Administration Centres are now found in several Districts, and 
jointly house various central and local government departments. 
Similarly, in a small system, district-level officers can relatively 
easily go directly to national level when necessary, thanks to 
funding for transport and telecommunications, or the easy
availability of lifts. Other facilitating factors are: the wealth 
of research on rural development in Botswana, which gives district 
planning materials to draw onf and the limited tribalism and other 
factionalism, so that a heavy reliance on informal coordination is 
workable. [2]
There has also been some enthusiasm and esprit amongst district- 
level planning cadres. One factor originally was reliance on 
expatriate volunteers, who were generally committed to their loca­
tion and job (e.g. as judged by regular overtime) and not diverted 
by other demands (including the precautions necessitated by per­
manent residence!). The reverse side of this was their transience, 
and liability to underestimate vital political, social and ad­
ministrative matters.
There have been other factors too behind enthusiasm :- training 
and backup from MLGL HQ, the optimistic national mood, and, very 
importantly, the relatively easy availability of resources (funds, 
transport and other equipment), which allows planning to be about 
something and done with something.
Much of this assessment carries over to the planning system as a 
whole. Helping sustain 12% p.a. growth over two decades, and a 
faster yet orderly growth of public spending, is a notable feat. 
There have been massive increases in functioning social infrastruc­
ture, both in the areas of central and of local government 
responsibility. (E.g. by the mid-80s over 85% of the primary school 
age population was at school. However, data on the quality of 
primary education and health are hard to find.)
A feature we stressed is that planning has been integrated into 
development management. Planners have typically been closely in­
volved in much development administration and policy discussion as 
well as in project and budgetary matters. This partly reflects the 
comparative weakness of administrative cadres, but is also a 
deliberate choice, to bolster planners' influence and standing.
There are the usual tensions between MFDP, the Ministerial Planning 
Units, and Districts. Each is aware of factors liable to be over­
looked by the others. There are also standard problems in evolution 
away from a previously more centralized planning system, as and when 
Ministerial and District units grow in experience and size. The 
central Ministry may indulge in false comparisons, between the 
actual quality of work done outside and the notional quality of its 
own interventions, based on a wishful belief in its own unlimited 
capacities. Operation of the Planning Officer cadre is still on the 
whole relatively smooth, with much informal coordination. For 
example, around half the cadre will be present for a meeting in MFDP 
early every Monday morning, to exchange information and views. [3] 
Districts are not part of this circle, but have a number of at least 
potential representatives: from MLGL, the "link-men" in each 
Ministry, and the Rural Development Unit.
The Rural Development Unit (RDU) in MFDP illustrates the potential 
advantages and conditions behind intensive informal coordination 
centering on the planning ministry. MFDP carries portfolio respon­
sibility for rural development coordination.. The RDU is the 
secretariat of the policy-making Rural Development Council composed 
of Ministers and Permanent Secretaries-. The Unit has -the right. 
simply to receive information and commission studies, and the 
responsibility to spread information, provide advice and assistance, 
bring people together, and- ensure- that important matters receive 
attention.
Leach, Senior Adviser to the RDU in 1973-79, proposes that the Unit 
had a significant role in the 70s in promoting development in rural 
areas. It did this by coordination and persuasion, rather than by 
claiming powers that conflicted with those of the executive agencies 
or with their operational requirements. He argues that: "Too often 
co-ordination is confused with direction. ...Coordination is, in 
fact, better achieved through communication and information 
linkages, through consensus and negotiation, than by directives and 
orders..." (1981:268-9).
Such coordination depends on, firstly, good institutional location. 
It is helpful to keep rural development prominent in the Planning 
Ministry, rather than leave it mainly to a more marginal agency, 
such as a generalist ministry that lacks a power base. (Note the 
contrast here with the fate of some ministries or departments of 
Rural or Community Development elsewhere, e.g. in Zimbabwe or 
India.)
Secondly, it requires a work culture that puts value on dis­
cussion and compromise. Tswana culture shares these values.
Thirdly, it depends on "an infinite capacity to take trouble 
over the nuts and bolts and details - organizing meetings, dis­
cussions, visits, tours, seminars, conferences, transport, etc." 
(ibid.:269). This raises questions about the perpetuation of such a 
system: what will motivate bureaucrats to go on taking infinite 
pains? - especially as the system expands and as an inspiring post­
independence era ends.
Finally, and relatedly, successful informal coordination depends 
on good judgement, in knowing when and how to infringe on others' 
time. Without that, people will soon weary of strings of ad hoc and 
single purpose meetings (Pearce, 1986).
Given these various conditions, as well as" the others mentioned 
earlier, it may not be surprising to see reports that intensive 
informal coordination has worked on average less well at village 
level. [4]
To conclude, the flexibility of the economic planning system in 
Botswana is precisely what enables it to retain a grip; the plan and 
the budget stay in touch. The second major feature that we 
stressed, the use of intensive informal coordination, is. closely 
connected. Flexible planning requires these intensive information 
exchanges; and the maintenance of a central grip requires both the
flexibility and the interaction, in order to stay broadly accept­
able.
There have been some favourable conditions associated with the 
system's reported success:- the presence of relatively large plan­
ning cadres for a small country; the greater ease of close liaison 
in a -small system (though it can still work in decentralized subsys­
tems in larger countries); the absence of very strong competition 
for staff, from a large private sector or foreign neighbours; con­
siderable career rewards for many planners (in terms of job quality, 
perks and promotion prospects); and the relaxed political setting. 
Associated with several of these are the favourable economic 
conditions. The Botswana lesson is not of how to turn water into 
wine, but how to turn potential successes into real successes.
4. ISSUES AND STRAINS IN THE 1980s 
4.1 Emerging problems
Section 3 concentrated on strengths of the Botswana planning 
system, seen as an adaptation to the constraints of a very small 
open economy, and as a machinery for pursuing government priorities 
and taking opportunities within the given constraints - especially 
project-aid opportunities. We have not commented much on the 
priorities themselves, or on the persistence and growth of extreme 
inequalities amidst the economic boom, or the high degree of con­
centration of wealth and activity in Gaborone. (By the early 1980s 
still only a third of government development expenditure was in 
rural areas where four-fifths of the population lived; Mmusi et al, 
1982:18.) Picard (1987) wisely warns us against a "Botswanaphilia" 
comparable to the "Tanzophilia" of the early and mid 70s. Our 
discussion has emphasized system-rationale rather than strategy 
evaluation.
Botswana's economic success is vulnerable, as it rests largely on a 
single exhaustible mineral export and is in a fragile natural 
environment. Years of continuing drought in the 1980s have left 
arable agriculture on its knees and many more villagers without 
cattle. While there is considerable institutional robustness and 
phlegm, they will be tested by growing problems. Enormously rapid 
urbanization is underway, including as the "major villages" become 
in effect small towns; and there is a marked growth in media, educa­
tion, opposition parties, and urban unemployment. The period of 
super-growth is probably ending, as Botswana already exceeds South 
Africa in diamond production; although major new mineral exports are 
still likely.
WHile the drought relief schemes in the 1980s and the ongoing provi­
sion of physical infrastructure for rural districts have been 
effective, the attempts to advance rural employment and incomes in 
productive and sustainable ways - neither mainly about physical 
infrastructure nor as crash programmes - have to date been far less
successful. Just as with ARDP, the successes are with essentially 
distributive programmes that are less constrained by the demands of 
productive efficiency.
What are needed are jobs as numerous as those generated in relief 
programmes, but ones that are more productive. The formal sector 
provides employment for only about 20% of the population over the 
age of 15. Formal sector employment grew at over 7% p.a. in 1968- 
83, but absorbed much less than half the increase in the-labour 
force (Isaksen, 1981:17; & Botswana, 1985). (The numbers of 
Batswana officially employed in South Africa fell considerably; e.g. 
the proportion fell from 40% of formal employment of Botswana na­
tionals in 1966 to 19% in 1980.) For the NDP VI period, 1985-91, 
formal sector employment growth was predicted to slow to less than 
6% p.a.
The problems in creating large-scale productive employment are 
formidable: small markets, remoteness, the instability and des­
tabilization coming from South Africa, and the competition from 
large established producers in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
Membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) provides 
premium revenues, which government can use for infrastructure and 
distribution, but it further constrains industrial development. 
Finally, there is the very difficult physical environment. 
Longstanding attempts to advance peasant arable agriculture have had 
no success to date; and nothing on offer has matched the new attrac­
tions in towns and the urbanizing major villages. Agriculture is 
now a smaller proportion of GDP than even manufacturing. [1] While 
the country might become in part a rentier, drawing income from its 
savings placed abroad, this will not sustain satisfactory 
livelihoods for the majority.
Some authors argue that development of productive employment is 
undermined by biases in the government system, for example towards 
fiscal conservatism, the formal sector, or over-centralization. 
Government has certainly been fiscally conservative, and perhaps 
preoccupied with sectors that either generate government revenues 
(mines and imports) or elite incomes (beef), or are relatively easy 
channels for expenditure, namely physical and social infrastructure. 
(See e.g. Isaksen, 1981.) These leanings may be furthered by some 
tendencies of the international aid system (see Morgan, 1979, on the 
Botswana case.) Official discussions appear to be dominated by how 
to further assist and encourage formal sector enterprise.
For the 1970s Isaksen argued that influential expatriates in MFDP 
were biased to fiscal conservatism, due to their own career 
requirements; but reverse arguments can equally be made. [2] More 
significantly, as he noted, many had been influenced by Zambia. The 
real issue might not be one of increasing expenditure but instead 
its redirection. Yet Isaksen did not specify areas for this. He 
also acknowledged the limit set to spending by domestic leaders'
decision not to bring in many more expatriates; and the vul­
nerability of the economy, which was later underlined by 1982's 
diamond market problems.
The electorate, as we noted in section 2.1, has been largely poor, 
unmobilized and, to date, -easily pacified—by expendi-tures. -It is 
probably easier to get mobilization around policies like high mini­
mum wages or the provision of quasi-urban infrastructure, than for 
the broad and indirect policies that might be needed for furthering 
productive employment (Isaksen, 1981:32); Lipton's 1978 report had 
little short-run impact. Wages policy is an area where MFDP has 
until lately been weak, reflecting its focus on public sector 
projects and revenues. Legally specified minimum wage rates soared 
from the mid 1970s. This had direct and severe impact on the 
viability of many NGOs that were trying to generate new types of 
productive rural employment - notably the Brigades and the Regional 
Development Associations. (See van Rensburg, 1984, and Inger, 
1985.) Even the higher wage rates applied in the public sector had 
important indirect effects: drawing people away from the NGOs, as 
well as raising worker expectations and demands.
The Ministry of Commerce & Industry and other government agencies 
made various conventional attempts through the 1970s and 80s to 
encourage new formal sector jobs. Modest but expensive progress was 
made. The "factory shells" programme was a particular failure and 
was handed over to Councils (Commerce & Industry, 1982). In 1982 a 
Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) was set up, offering 100% grants 
to new businesses, subject to a few conditions. The official 
evaluation of its first two years estimated that the average finan­
cial cost of the extra jobs for which it was responsible was up to 
P15,000 (though less for the small grants allocated by Districts, 
and for the medium-size projects administered from the centre). [3] 
There were also opportunity costs, as government staff (e.g. the 
Rural Industrial Officers) were diverted to administering the 
scheme. The new business that was supported was mainly urban; and 
often represented diversification by the largest cattle owners.
A recent comprehensive survey of possible small industries indicated 
very few worth further attention (Egner, 1984). Interest has 
returned to the idea of labour-intensive development projects 
(LIDEPs), which was effectively shelved during NDP V because all 
resources were taken by the drought relief effort. These projects 
are more demanding than drought relief, where .labourers may be 
desperate, willing to take almost any wage, and are not pressed to 
work hard. (See Box 5.)
Lessons can be learnt from the successes of labour-intensive 
Council road maintenance as well as of drought relief. The former 
offers a model for the systematic build-up of technical and manage­
ment methods, and of technical cadres; and both of them
BOX 5 CONTINUING DROUGHT RELIEF? OR DROUGHT RELIEF PLUS?
Egner argues for the continuation of relief programmes at high 
levels, in view of the very low and even declining living standards 
of- peThaps most rural dwellers-even before the 1980s droughts. .It. is 
also wasteful to repeatedly build up drought relief organization and 
then wind it down. MLGL accepts this. Drought relief might become a 
standing social security programme, for it is popular too with 
peasants and politicians.
The drought programme covers "relief" and "rehabilitation", not 
"development". Hay (1988) argues that this conventional division is 
inadequate. Attention and resources are likely to be exhausted 
before a "development" stage. In addition, some dwellers can hardly 
be rehabilitated to their earlier position. Severe droughts bring 
not only temporary declines in rural incomes and employment; many 
rural dwellers permanently lose assets, and may leave agriculture. 
Relief programmes should therefore also try to generate sustainable 
new jobs, in agriculture and outside. In other words, can relief and 
rehabilitation stages contain a development orientation? Hay admits 
that typical public works schemes are neither chosen nor owned by, 
nor largely benefit, the destitute people who build them; but he 
hopes that public works could somehow be reoriented - perhaps by 
administrative goodwill - towards the poorest groups. Holm & Cohen 
note that such targeting could . meet broad local resistance 
(1986:23).
The 1981 drought consultants stressed the need to distinguish be­
tween the distributive labour-based relief programmes (LBRPs), for 
fast response, and more productive labour-intensive development 
projects (LIDEPs), which need more careful design and management. 
The skilled manpower needed for LIDEPs could take many years to 
build up - and is then hard to keep in rural areas. Hay, for one, 
queries the necessity, feasibility and effectiveness of convention­
ally planned and staffed projects, and believes in "a large 
[dormant] pool of local organizational and management skills [that] 
is typically overlooked" (1988:1124). He argues that supporting 
community development initiatives will no doubt produce many 
failures, but still a higher return to public resources than would 
reliance only on conventional projects. Here is one central, clas­
sic, area of difference between centralizers and decentralizers. The 
former group are likely to reject Hay's claims. They argue too that 
a strategy of a permanent LBRP dole, which redistributes some 
mineral revenues to rural areas, might not survive a decline in 
those revenues or simply the ever-growing pressure of population. 
Already in the Sixth National Plan (NDP VI) document, the rate of 
population growth in a high scenario exceeds that of GDP growth in a 
pessimistic scenario. Botswana is in any case not Kuwait. It is 
still a low income country, with a per capita income in 1987 of 
around US $900.
illustrate the possibility of by-passing the urban-focussed minimum 
wage system by a special dispensation to rural local authorities. 
The road maintenance and improvement project has been prepared as 
carefully as drought relief, building up slovly from a pilot phase 
in Central District. It has now been extended to the other dis­
tricts, having' proved- its cost-effectiveness. (The inevitably 
modest technical standards fail to impress some of the national 
elite in their new cars, or to end the calls for fast capital- 
intensive- upgrading.) Note that both cases involve 
decentralization.
Similarly, one of the few industries that was indicated as having 
good possibilities is tourism, which might lend itself well to 
promotion by local authorities (Egner, 1987:131). MLGL did not 
accept that Councils were ready to assume this as a statutory 
responsibility (1987:21). Indeed Councils have shown little inter­
est in directly promoting production, and feel it to be the 
responsibility of other bodies. Councils' Commercial Officers do 
little more than issue licenses. District plans have emphasized 
physical and social infrastructure, not production, though this is 
changing in some CFDAs.
A.2. De- and re-centralization in the 1980s
The centre's response to a decline in diamond revenues during 
1981-82 was to apply both financial stringency and closer control. 
This control appears to be continuing subsequently, related (in the 
centre's mind) to the ongoing drought, the fragile international 
situation and, most importantly, an expected levelling-off of 
diamond revenues, even if now at much more than fully recovered 
levels. One issue is whether the centre is overestimating its own 
capacity for close control, in contrast to the growing decentralized 
capacity; but the centre feels it knows better than others what this 
capacity is!
There are various views on the present allocation of powers. Box 6 
gives a simplified summary picture. In the following section we 
will illustrate these views, as seen in the ongoing discussions. In 
the mid-to-late 1980s certain steps seem to strengthen 
decentralization. There have also been counter-trends. One needs a 
multi-stranded picture of something as complex as a resource alloca­
tion system; nor can one expect irreversible trends.
Many of the problems with local authorities continue. [1] Audit 
reports on Councils remain critical. The Local Government Structure 
Commission (LGSC) had recommended an independent Local Authorities 
Public Accounts Committee, to give a properly separated system of 
review. Government accepted this in 1982 but it remained only on 
paper until 1987; and the new central Local Authorities Finance Unit
BOX 6 - VIEVS ON GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION
For sake of contrast the views can be somewhat exaggerated.
an official brochure view:- the present system is a fine blend 
and balance- of old and new-, and of -deconcent-ration and devolution; 
it spreads risks and opportunities, across interlinked institutions 
which mutually support, supervise and complement each other.
one informal central government view, sometimes found underneath 
the brochure, argues why no further decentralization (especially 
territorial) should be contemplated: sector approaches work; 
decentralization is often just a luxury, with high costs in time and 
effectiveness; and devolved institutions in particular, including 
Councils, are chronically incompetent, cannot fulfill their allotted 
responsibilities, and need to be directed.
the reply from decentralized institutions, especially Councils 
(e.g. as reported in"Picard, 1979b), is that their relative weakness 
was because they have been starved of resources and authority, and 
treated like children.
radical/political-science explanation of this marginalization 
suggests that devolved institutions in particular are seen as poten­
tial threats to the interests of ruling elites. Elites then wish to 
retain close local control, for example via the District 
Administration, and to keep Councils weak in case they become 
centres of opposition, such as to land policies that favour large 
cattle owners (Picard & Morgan, 1985).
there are explanations for central power in terms of a logic of 
urban bias, that tends to keep the District Administration and 
deconcentrated staff weak too. These arguments note the social and 
career .considerations that orient staff towards the capital. The 
dominant capital-city technocrats are also absorbed in a separate 
(and more professionally exciting) world: controlling financial 
demands, obtaining aid and maximizing its use, and so on; some 
hardly ever visit District centres (or remoter locations) let alone 
work there. This last sort of explanation is still compatible with 
increased interest in decentralization when aid donors press for it. 
Even the explanation in terms of ruling elite interests can ac­
comodate a new concern with decentralization, if perceptions of 
those interests evolve with time, e.g. if elites come to feel more 
secure, or to consider that security is best furthered by allowing 
opposition rather than trying to undermine it.
a "balanced" view (e.g. Reilly, 1983) accepts part of each the 
earlier views, i.e. that the local government system is soundly 
designed, but was left short of resources; that there are of course 
both structural and political limits to decentralization, and that 
while Councils should be strengthened they can themselves be elitist 
(like the kgotla); whereas deconcentrated agencies have a con­
siderable role to play too in furthering local developments. So it 
concludes, as in the brochure - but going beyond it - that a mixture 
is best, but with some further degree of both devolution and 
deconcentration.
does not increase Councils' ability to meet their responsibilities. 
HLGL officers (actually Finance and Planning Officers seconded from 
MFDP) may even have intervened more than before in issuing funds to 
Councils. Far from being treated like parastatals, Councils were 
sometimes placed lower than Ministry departments. For example, 
release of development funds was- in some instances blocked if 
Councils failed to supply reports on a quarterly basis (Egner, 
1986:92). Despite augmentation of staff, the implementation ratio 
for Council projects barely increased. [2]
Dependence on central grants increased to around 85% of recurrent 
budgets by 1986/7. It will have increased yet further (Segodi 
implies to 98%) after central government abolished local government 
tax, in 1987. There is clearly no intention of reducing the fiscal 
dependence of local government. The abolition was also however one 
of the easiest and surest ways of transferring income to all the 
rural population, ana-was no doubt very popular during the continu­
ing drought.
The current major training push for local government seems to be 
making reasonable progress in terms of numbers of trainees (Egner, 
1987). The approach being taken - after redesign by a local con­
sultant - emphasises in-service training and local trainers, through 
an upgraded ULGS Training Unit and a new cadre of Personnel/Training 
Officers in local government. Where institutional . training is 
called for, the emphasis is on use of existing local institutions, 
not new ones or foreign courses (Higgins, 1987.)
It is early as yet to judge impact. There may be the standard 
problems of course status, and of individuals preferring to go to 
the capital, or better to Europe or America, even if the training 
they receive is of less job relevance. In addition there are fac­
tors which can limit the effect of training alone. Many staff are 
too old and/or underqualified to be likely to benefit from formal 
training (though the programme does include on-the-job training.) A 
key target for training should be the elected Councillors, whose 
educational backgrounds remain very weak.
Filling senior technical posts is still a problem, and recruitment 
of expatriates has been turned to. ULGS have remained near the 
bottom in government's allocation of graduates (Botswana, 1985:90) 
and of postgraduate scholarships (Egner, 1987:47). Many of the 
graduates sent to Councils soon left. In-service reassignment of 
good staff is almost never from centre to districts, but often 
happens in the other direction, especially within the Local 
Government ministry itself. Staff willingness is of course one 
factor here. In 1981 it was agreed to make the administrators of 
ULGS belong to it themselves; but that would render them liable to 
work in Councils. It had not been implemented six years later, when 
it was repudiated by MLGL (1987:13). [3]
Councils' dissatisfaction with ULGS remained strong, both over 
operating problems and the very fact of Gaborone civil servants
managing the staff of elected bodies. The Structure Commission's 
proposal for an independent Local Government Service Commission - 
with a status commensurate to the size of the local government 
sector - remained rejected.
Major expansion in local authority resources is due to continue 
during NDP VI (1985-91). ULGS is at last represented on 
Government's graduate allocation committee; and ULGS conditions of 
service are being equated to central government's. Reilly (1983) 
queries why this capacity-building did not occur in the 1970s. 
Councils' operating problems were known, and donor funds would have 
been easily available. Implicitly, central government matters 
received strong priority; and there was some fear of the growth of 
opposition parties. But the previous decade was also packed with 
rapid changes that absorbed official attention. The fact that 
capacity-building eventually moved into high gear in the 1980s, 
after the 1978-81 reports, could suggest that it was not so much 
blocked in the 1970s as hardly considered.
Picard (1979b, 1985) has reported that in the mid-70s even most 
District Administration officers held Councils in low regard. Most 
held the Tribal Administration to be more important. A significant 
minority of District Administration and other deconcentrated of­
ficers felt that their role included controlling Councils, not just 
advising and interacting (Picard & Morgan, 1985:268-274). One would 
expect that Councils were sometimes viewed equally condescendingly - 
if and when thought of - in the citadels of central ministries, not 
least in some key sections of Finance or Agriculture. [4]
In summarizing a national workshop on participation, Tsiane and 
Youngman described the prevailing view in Ministries: "participation 
is conceived as primarily an element of development planning and 
..as the domain of public officers rather than politicians.... 
participation [is] consultation for better planning and service- 
delivery"; and to participate is to be be a recipient in a 
government programme and listen to official addresses (1986:viii). 
These administrative and centralist biases and the associated plan­
ning philosophy are unfavourable to devolution. Together with any 
opposition from ruling politicians, they would help to explain why, 
in Egner's terms, "administrative" solutions to local authorities' 
problems have been preferred, rather than "political" solutions 
which give "local authorities" clearer authority. MLGL has for 
example rejected the proposal that Councils should have more power 
to decide spending priorities between sectors (1987:20-1).
The upgrading of the District Administration in the mid-80s is 
consistent with these analyses. It is also consistent though with 
the view that DCs and District Officers need high levels of skills 
to be effective in development coordination; and DCs have not 
received the formal prefectoral powers of Provincial or District 
Governors in many other countries. The DC does now outrank the 
Council Secretary. Correspondingly all DC posts were reselected in
1986-7. A new scheme of training gives the District Administration 
a more attractive career path than the ULGS, with guaranteed foreign 
postgraduate studies for DOs.
Note however that some central Ministries tend to ignore District 
Administrations and DDCs jusir as much as they do Councils. Indeed 
the upgrading of the DC post may partly be a response to that. Some 
Ministries, notably Agriculture, for long declined to align their 
operational districts with the administrative districts. In 1986 
they were instructed to do so. Central Ministries are absorbed in 
their ambitious work, programmes. This produces both a self- 
righteous belief in centralization ("look at how much we are 
achieving [and compare it with the feeble Councils]"), and a self­
licensing ignorance (of what are local authorities' problems, 
capacities, and achievements). In MFDP in particular, too few of 
the dominant economists have (or had) worked extensively in other 
Ministries, let alone in Districts. Egner reports that some of them 
view Council projects as "social" and hence not to be considered for 
domestic funding, but passed to possible "soft" (usually 
Scandinavian) donors (1987:90). The Rural Development Unit in MFDP 
used to contain a series of ex-DCs and DOs, and perhaps worked to 
"soften" the economists and financial administrators; but it seems 
to have relatively declined in the mid-80s.
The Ministry of Health is currently somewhat of an exception to what 
has just been said. Egner reports good cooperation between the 
Ministry and the Councils, with a large expansion of the former's 
Regional Health Teams and of the latter's health staff, culminating 
in 1986 in transfer of the Health Teams to Councils. He claims 
that, judged by the conventional indicators, "Botswana now has the 
best rural health record in Africa" (1986:110); though other ac­
counts are less favourable (Sterkenburg, 1987).
Recent medium-term District Plans have been restricted to mainly 
focus on implementation of the existing National Plan, and not also 
provide a major input to its successor. The 1983-86 Plans were 
started rather late and at a time of considerable staff turnover. 
After they had been prepared, the MFDP 1983 Mid-Term Review in 
effect declared them to be obsolete because of now perceived revenue 
problems. They were never even fully printed. Later, government 
revenues proved to be higher, not lower, than had been assumed by 
the guidelines originally issued for the 1983/6 Plans (Egner, 
1986:94).
Tordoff (1988) questions whether the work put into very detailed 
district plans is still justified. From 1985 there has been an MLGL 
Budget Priorities Committee, which allocates funds between MLGL 
projects within a total ceiling set by MFDP. The committee has no 
direct representation of, nor even obligatory consultation with, 
DDCs and Councils; nor does MLGL propose that it should (1987:18). 
Allocation of development funds is on an annual basis, and project- 
by-project; with allocations announced a few weeks before the new
financial year, and not actually released until well into it. 
Districts' development funds are thus treated in the same way as 
recurrent funds, and Districts are not being given indications of 
the minimum sums they can plan around for the years beyond the 
coming one. According to Egner this was one factor behind a decline 
in quality of the District Plans for 1986-89, which he describes as 
still estimable analyses of conditions and themes, but programmati­
cally now closer to shopping-lists than before (Egner, 1987:103). 
Even within the annual allocations the degree of central control has 
in some cases increased. From 1978 DDCs had the power to allocate 
sums up to P 10,000 for some types of project. In 1984 this power 
was withdrawn or lapsed. (In 1987 MLGL supported Egner's recommen­
dation to restore the power, up to a ceiling of P30,000; ibid.:16, 
90-1.) In various other areas, centralized management has grown, 
often related to the project procedure requirements of non-”soft" 
donors.
Investment targets for Councils for NDP VI are even less than their 
NDP V achievement. The very large scheduled increases in recurrent 
budgets are primarily for Councils to operate established in­
frastructure and services. It is possible that district-level 
capacity had declined temporarily in some areas, due to rapid 
localization. Localization has partly come in waves, with a whole 
cadre being targetted for rapid replacement through a donor- 
supported project, rather than a more gradual localization across 
many cadres at the same time. For example, the D0(D) and CP0 cadres 
were fully localized in 1980-84. As a result they were staffed in 
part by non-economist new graduates considered not good enough for 
the central Planning Officer cadre, which takes the pick and 
declines to extend its coverage to district work. But while those 
with no taste for district work probably soon leave, Tordoff reports 
that a fair number of the new district staff have done well. 
Unfortunately at the same time the MLGL Planning Unit which supports 
and supervises them was often seriously understaffed (1988:189).
There is a more important problem, of career structure, that leads 
to frustration and resignations amongst district-level planners. 
The absence of a clear career progression for these cadres did not 
raise problems as long as they were staffed by expatriates; but is 
now a major issue. D0(D)s, D0(L)s and CPOs are excluded from the 
professional grades of the central hierarchies of economists, town 
planners, agriculturalists, et al. In theory, rotation of staff 
between centre and districts would be good for both; but it may be 
resisted by those already ensconced at the centre. Incorporation of 
local staff into central hierarchies might also be resisted by 
Councils and DCs. Another option for the District Officers, espe­
cially D0(D)s, is to make the District Administration their normal 
indicated promotion route. However, if DCs retain a political 
control role rather than become District Development Directors, this 
option could require a redefinition of the D0(D) role to make it 
similar to that of a Zimbabwean Deputy District Administrator. That 
officer works mainly but not entirely on development programmes (in
contrast to Zimbabwe's District Rural Development Officers). The 
upgrading of DCs does at least allow scope for more promotion steps 
for the officers below them, leaving the higher-fliers to either 
take the step into Commissionership or transfer out of the District 
Administration.
Despite these various strains, there is little reason to believe 
that local-level capacity in general has declined relative to the 
centre's. Central planning units too have been.affected by rapid 
turnover and localization and by vacancies; whereas for the 
District-level, much training is underway, cadres are being ex­
panded, and many specialized posts are now emerging to reduce the 
total load (if not the coordination load) previously carried by the 
generalist planners.
Egner queries whether Councils' increased capacity is being well 
harnessed, for executing even existing activities, let alone new 
statutory functions. From a project-by-project analysis, he argues 
that the disappointing implementation record for local government 
projects in the NDP V period, despite the increase in Council man­
power, was due less to District-level incapacity - the stereotype 
derived from the 1970s - than to blockages in MLGL HQ and MFDP: in 
making policy decisions, dealing with donors, and writing project 
memoranda, and in the centralized management of procurement and 
construction. If the main blockages were at District-level, how 
were they able to implement so much extra drought relief work in 
1983-5? (Egner, 1986:82-90). If blockages are to be found at the 
centre, this suggests a possible contradiction between increasing 
resources for District level activity yet also increasing central 
control.
From central policymakers' viewpoint, the ability of lower level 
bodies to spend fast can understandably sometimes be felt as part of 
the problem rather than of the answer. Apart from the centre's 
caution, or even jumpiness, on entering what will be a new financial 
phase, there may be a desire to balance more decentralization of 
resources with more centralization of control. This reflects a 
preference for control, and reaction to the capture of several 
Councils by the opposition, but also some other implied beliefs, 
which might often be questioned:- first, in the centre's capacity 
for ever more supervision, of a large number of local agencies; 
second, that more central control will not have significant negative 
effects on local mobilization and activity; and third, that Councils 
are unsuitable as a major vehicle not only for direct employment and 
production programmes but even for their promotion. Whether and how 
these views will evolve remains to be seen.
5. CONCLUSION
"..in comparison...with other and larger African states 
that have not been able to use state structures to 
[effectively] plan and implement socio-economic change... 
the Botswana model suggests that at least a modest form 
of [public sector] development management is feasible"
(Picard, 1987:271).
Rather than give a summary repetition of previous sections, it will 
be more interesting to conclude with a review of themes. As we 
mentioned in the introduction, disappointments with technique- 
oriented central and regional planning led in the 1970s to more 
appreciation of the administrative, as opposed to mathematical, 
complexities of development programmes. The State is not integral; 
it has many parts, each with different information and different 
interests. Paper planning therefore may not take one far, espe­
cially in fast-moving environments. One must consider "the 
organisation of the complex relationships within governments and the 
need and procedures for linking analyses carried out by different 
levels of government" (Allan & Hinchliffe, 1982:147).
More specifically, there has been much attention - first - to how to 
make planning more operational, e.g. linking it to budgeting, and - 
second - to how to involve agents at various levels, by multi-level 
planning or "decentralization". In both cases, planning clearly 
becomes a part of development administration/management, not just a 
separate technical specialism; and emphasis must go to providing and 
operating channels for regular interaction of the many agents 
involved.
These two lines are partly competitive:- increasing the effective 
reach of national planning, by its integration with budgeting, can 
run into competition at some points with trying to improve effec­
tiveness through decentralization. Strong central control can 
reduce lower-level interest; and even the best-designed set of 
procedures relies to an extent on the cooperation or enthusiasm of 
participants, for example in providing good information (Gasper, 
1986.)
Botswana has interesting experience in both these areas, as well as 
of their conflicts. At present the balance is more in favour of the 
national planners, but with a serious degree of decentralization. 
We saw that central government is marked by exceptional integration, 
while local government consists of no fewer than four active bodies. 
The central planning ministry exercises much of its integrative 
power through a carefully designed budgetary and planning mechanism. 
The mechanism is at the same time notably adaptive, and so minimizes 
the impact on others in terms of restriction or frustration. Segodi 
agrees that the very "flexibility in the planning and budgeting 
system allays most of the loud criticism of the system" and of its 
continuing strong central control (1988:7). The system is perhaps
at its least flexible in dealing with rural local government 
programmes; but here its emphases on intensive informal coordination 
and multiple channels of communication come in, and help in handling 
incipient conflicts.
Close examination of a particular case highlighted the complexity of 
"decentralization" and the difficulty in making generalizations. We 
could see that "decentralization" is multi-dimensional; so any 
measure of it should be a vector, not a scalar. In Botswana there 
is not just "deconcentration" as well as "devolution"; there is a 
four-part local administration, and differences according to sector 
(e.g. agriculture versus health) and aspect (e.g. provision of 
personnel or of finance). Decentralization is also not a zero-sum 
game: effective capacity can increase at both central and lower
levels.
The quadripartite local administration is of some interest. It 
arguably allows a spreading of risks, as well as some mutual sup­
port, supervision and disciplining (LGSC, 1979; Reilly, 1983; Egner, 
1987; Tordoff, 1988). It may also dilute centre-local conflict. 
Streamlining has been practised instead where it is really important 
in the number of Ministries and departments, so avoiding the 
extremes seen in Zimbabwe.
While avoiding proliferation of organizations, Botswana has invested 
heavily in planners, and put them to work on more than preparing 
paper plans. The weight of the investment here has to be seen in 
comparison to other countries, rather than in financial terms. 
These steps appear to have paid dividends. Clearly though the 
country's ability to provide attractive job rewards in government 
(relative to other sectors) has been critical.
There are great pitfalls in advancing such points as "lessons"; 
but Botswana's richly recorded experience offers a variety of sug­
gestions, which do merit careful consideration.
Mawhood concluded 1 a recent review of international experiences by 
advancing two propositions (1987:21-2). Put simply, successful 
decentralization occurs when political conditions are good, so that 
governments do not feel threatened, and economic conditions are bad, 
so that they are seeking to harness local resources and initiatives. 
This may fit the situation in Botswana after independence. Then in 
the late 60s and early 70s political opposition grew slightly, 
economic conditions improved, and centralization probably increased. 
In the late 70s and early 80s the opposition stagnated, and govern­
ment agreed to strengthen Councils. However, the economic strains 
or fears in the 1980s have probably led to new centralization. This 
does not fit Mawhood's model so well. On the other hand political 
opposition has revived a little; and at present the government does 
not feel sufficiently pressed, interested or hopeful for it to lay 
much stress on local mobilization.
So . far, the system has been still too small, homogeneous and 
economically fortunate for there to be great pressure for further 
decentralization. There are some arguments that decentralization 
could help employment generation, but central government seems 
mistrustful of ' that option, and especially of devolution. As 
Botswana is probably one of the countries in the region with more 
favourable political and economic conditions for decentralization, 
and for policy experimentation, it will be interesting to follow 
what happens next.
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NOTES
1. Introduction
[1] GDP in current prices rose from P37m. in 1966 to P997m. in 
1982/83; or, in 1979/80 prices, from P129m. to P969m. (Botswana, 
1985:14). The growth rate over two decades is the fastest in the 
world, including on a per capita basis (Lewis & Sharpley, 1988:1). 
The Botswana pula is approximately equal in value to the Zimbabwe 
dollar. In the 1970s it was typically worth around US$1.20; in 
1982-83 around US$0.95; falling later with the rand, to around 
US$0.50-0.55, as it is in late 1988.
[2] My discussion of drought relief is indebted to Holm & Morgan 
(1985).
[3] Egner (1986) argues that some Councils could even have spent 
more, but that officials at the centre got jittery. However, some 
other Councils were in difficulty, and it is hard for. the centre, to 
know which are which.
[4] See Egner for figures and assumptions (e.g. exclusion of 
teachers, soldiers and fully aid-funded staff, inclusion of police; 
1987:115).
[5] Deconcentration is the allocation of some responsibilities to 
lower levels within national Ministries. Devolution is the alloca­
tion of authority and powers to local government agencies that are 
locally selected. We cannot expect to capture the full range of 
situations with just these two labels.
2.1 The setting and the leadership
[1] There are some sub-districts, with their own District Officers.
[2] Isaksen presents the two key concerns here as being (i) retain­
ing demonstrable political independence while not provoking South 
African destabilization, and (ii) "to refrain from promoting inter­
ests which are seen as directly in competition with those of the 
cattle industry" (1981:33). The official Rural Income Distribution 
Survey (1974/5) suggested that Botswana had one of the most unequal 
rural distributions in Africa; and that around 45% of rural 
households had no cattle. The 1979/82 National Migration Survey 
also indicated rapidly increasing inequality amongst those who do 
own cattle: 7% of cattle owners had almost half the total herd,
which was then three million. Colclough & McCarthy (1980), amongst 
others, argue that the cattle industry is highly supported and
grossly undertaxed. However, with economic diversification, 
politics may be evolving beyond Isaksen's comment.
[3] In the early 1970s rural areas received less than 10% of 
government investment (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980:Ch.4).
[4] All quotations on ARDP in this paper are taken from Chambers 
(1977).
[5] "Experience since Independence with the difficulties of im­
plementing small construction and other rural improvement projects 
indicates that dramatic progress cannot be expected" (Botswana,
1973:41).
[6] There have of course been other vote catchers, such as aboli­
tion of primary school fees, or the 1980s' secondary school building 
programme.
[7] Picard argues that this was more than luck: chiefs were well 
aware what mineral discoveries might bring, and acted accordingly 
(1987:116).
[8] The high levels of aid reflected several factors: Botswana's
original backwardness; its economic smallness but range of
opportunities; and the attractiveness to many donors of its multi­
racial and mixed-economy philosophy, politically exposed situation, 
and relatively fast-moving and reliable bureaucracy.
2.2. Central Ministries
[1] For an analysis of the weakness of an isolated Planning Agency, 
see Hirschmann (1981) on Lesotho. MFDP's dominance in Botswana is 
partly hereditary. Before the early 1970s, spending Ministries had 
little room or capacity to argue. They lacked their own Planning 
Units, and all projects and even part of the recurrent budget were 
externally funded, with a low ceiling set in Whitehall not Botswana. 
Their own seconded Units appeared from the early to mid 70s (contra 
Tordoff, 1988; though they, were only counted on the MFDP estab­
lishment from 1982). MFDP predominance has largely continued; but 
Ministry Units when working well can often persuade MFDP.
[2] The cadre is mainly limited to economists but exceptions are 
fairly common, especially in sector ministries. In the early 1980s 
it included around 20 professionals in MFDP and 25 in sector minis­
tries; these numbers have now increased. There is a separate cadre 
of agricultural economists. See e.g. Whiteside (1984) on the work 
of Planning Officers.
[3] See evg. District papers to the 1986 NDDC. Dintwa (1986:6) 
reproduces, with reference to Botswana, this comment by Sharma on 
development administration in general: "field staff and extension 
officers...in actual operation, in many cases fall short of being 
efficient channels of two way communication.... Communication is 
often confined to the issuing of orders or instructions from head­
quarters to the field and submission of regular reports on routine 
matters in the opposite direction" (Sharma, 1986:19).
[4] I.e. revenues from the Southern African Customs Union, -aid, and 
from the beef parastatal and the diamonds joint venture. DTRP has 
offices in Gaborone and Francistown. Recently three district 
centres (Maun, Kanye and Serowe) each received a DTRP officer.
2.4. District Councils
[1] Quotations in this para, and the next are as given by Chambers 
(1977).
[2] Including Egner (1978), Local Govt. Structure Commission 
(1979), Picard & Endresen (1981), amongst others.
3.1. Flexible plans with legal authority
[1] Besides the 40-50 economist Planning Officers and up to 10 
agricultural economist planners (see section 2.2.), there have been 
the following cadres: one D0(D), one D0(L), and one (now two) CPO(s) 
per district (and sub-district; i.e. including Central's four sub­
districts); plus a CFDA coordinator and a Rural Industrial Officer 
per district; plus 10-15 town and regional planners, now increasing 
fast beyond that.
[2] The first four national plans were five-year plans, which were
all rolled over into a new plan after three years. The fifth and 
sixth plans (1979-85 and 1985-91) have moved to a new pattern, of 
six-year plans which are subject to a detailed analytical review in 
their fourth year. This Midterm Review, as done in 1983, then 
provides the starting point for preparation of the next pl,an, during 
the last two years of its predecessor. _
[3] For example, the intentional "overplanning" factor in NDP V was 
30%. Taking this into account, the total level of spending in 1979- 
82 was almost exactly the expected level (Botswana, 1983:58-9).
[4] Slightly different procedures are required with foreign-funded 
and domestically funded projects.
[5] In the NDP V period development expenditure was 111.5% of the 
initially projected level (Botswana, 1985).
[6] The 1983 Midterm Review reported that estimates of the recurrent 
costs arising were still inadequate. Implicitly, the spending 
ministries may tend to play down such costs; they know that once a 
project has been initiated it is highly unlikely to be terminated 
because recurrent costs are higher than originally indicated. Hence 
the Finance Ministry's insistence now on a surprisingly low ceiling 
for the growth of the development budget (2% p.a. in NDP VI). Some 
bigspending ministries have a second tactic; rather than try to 
recruit professional personnel, they largely rely on inducting their 
own trainees, whom government then finds it virtually impossible not 
to provide with permanent posts. . (Botswana, 1983:66, 116, 122-3).
3.2. District development planning
[1] Including amongst other members, officers from Agriculture and 
Commerce & Industry (especially their Rural Industrial Officer for 
the district). The committee administers small grants to new 
enterprises.
[2] Including officers from Agriculture, Health, adult education, 
community development, and family and social welfare. A new post of 
District Officer (Extension) was to be created in each district 
during NDP VI; the idea-was apparently dropped in favour of simply 
strengthening existing mechanisms.
[3] This committee aims to prepare and monitor land use plans, to 
guide and coordinate work by Agriculture, Wildlife, DTRP and others; 
and advises the Land Board. The District Officer (Lands) is execu­
tive secretary. D0(L)s have mostly had agriculture, geography, or 
environment backgrounds. Typically they have also functioned as 
handyman physical planners, and been involved with much project 
management; though these roles may have declined as other officers 
have appeared at district level.
[4] Vol. Ill of the 1973-8 National Plan consisted of 1500pp. of 
these area-and-project-description District Plans (Picard, 
1987:239).
[5] See Reilly (1981) for more details on preparation of District 
Plans.
3.3. Operating style and facilitating conditions
[1] There have been instances of Permanent Secretaries curbing the 
attendance of Planning Units at NDDC; but that was not general. The 
1986 NDDC for example included an open question-and-answer session 
with the head of the civil service. Central officers may not like 
District correspondence per se, & may or may not like visits from 
Districts, but can see these as the acceptable price for hospitality 
during desirable visits to Districts. However the PS of Local 
Government cancelled the 1988 NDDC, supposedly because the con­
ferences had elicited too little follow-Up from Ministries.
[2] Another possible factor is that in most areas of allocation, 
there is not an intrusive Party. Herbst (1987) has noted a contrast 
between the "political" style of land allocation in Zimbabwe and the 
"technocratic" administrative style of allocating rural health 
facilities. It seems to apply to Botswana too, for land as against 
most other planning areas.
[3] DTRP also attend. Many Planning Officers have had shared 
backgrounds - from studying together at the small University of 
Botswana or, in the past, coming via the U.K. Overseas Development 
Institute fellowship scheme.
[4] North East District note that "there is confusion because some 
of the extension workers give the [Village Extension Team, VEXT] a 
low priority.... It only depends on personalities...but where there 
is cooperation [the team., works very well." The same applies for 
the District Extension Team. Political conflicts can arise in VDCs, 
in one of the districts with a strong political opposition (1986:2- 
3); and committees often fail to have a quorum. Seitshiro (1986) 
analyses VEXTs' problems in terms of pressures on village-based
staff: from the centre, poor work conditions, remoteness, large
areas to cover, and pressure to concentrate on visible infrastruc­
tural projects.
— 4.1. Emerging problems
[1] Agriculture was around 5% of GDP in 1985-6 (admittedly these 
were drought years), down from 35-40% around independence (also a 
drought). It has declined in absolute terms since the mid-70s. 
Conventional -agricultural research may not be of much usa for the 
type of man-land systems in Botswana. Manufacturing was 8% of GDP 
in 1985, and has grown since independence at over 10% p.a. (from a 
very small base; Lewis & Sharpley, 1988).
[2] Isaksen argued that expatriates interested in later employment 
with international agencies would plump for financial caution. But 
the record of commercial bank lending to LDCs suggests that people 
who will not remain in_post to face the results of their financial 
commitments can instead prefer the kudos from large disbursement.
[3] NDP VI referred to 3200 jobs created with grants of P14m., up 
to Dec. 1984, i.e. at about P4,400 per job (Botswana, 1985:239). It 
later clarifies that this refers to medium-scale projects (p.240); 
and further, many of the projects would have started even without 
the FAP.
4.3. De- and re-centralization in the 1980s
[1] Coverage in this section is mainly to the start of 1987. It 
draws particularly on Egner (1986, 1987) for material while not 
necessarily accepting his interpretations. The version drawn in 
Sterkenburg (1987) makes exaggerated contrasts with the preceding 
period, based on a misunderstanding of the role of district plans, 
which have always been advisory.
[2] From 51% in 1976-9 to 55% in 1979-85. See Egner (1986) for 
basis of calculations. Note that 100% here refers to the TECs in 
force near the end of the period, when the figures for many projects 
have been raised above the original target, and when some other 
projects have been superseded and hence not acted on; also the TECs 
incorporate some intentional "overplanning". So the percentages 
give an overly poor impression.
[3] Egner states that none of the senior ULGS administrators in 
1986 had ever done so (1987:62).
[4] Even Leach (1981), in reviewing his 6 years as Rural 
Development Adviser in MFDP, has almost nothing to say on local 
authorities.
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